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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The need to replace existing infrastructure and the aim to connect an increasing share of energy from
renewable sources and distributed generation to the grid will drive major investments in electricity trans-
mission and distribution networks in the coming decades (Ofgem, 2014). The economic viability of such
investments depends on a comparison of benefits and costs. As transmission and distribution networks
are natural monopolies, though, there is no real market for the related services and hence no market
price to signal their value. Since the 1990s regulators of infrastructure industries around the globe have
therefore implemented incentive regulation models that mimic market mechanisms to promote efficiency
in such natural monopolies (Jamasb et al., 2012). The challenge is to set the incentives such that the
optimal level of service is provided.
To determine and incentivise the optimal service level, regulators have to estimate the marginal cost
curve and a demand curve (i.e. the customers’ wtp) for the respective services. Choice modelling is
broadly regarded as the most suitable method for estimating consumers’ wtp and thus mimic demand
for service improvements (Breidert et al., 2001). In fact, the estimation of wtp via stated choice experi-
ments has become an important part of price review processes of regulators such as Ofgem, the gas and
electricity market regulator in the uk. However, usually multinomial logit (mnl) models are employed to
elicit consumer preferences. These models assume homogeneous preferences within presumed consumer
segments and do not allow for differences in the consumers’ randomness of choice. This is despite empir-
ical evidence of heterogeneity in preferences and wtp (Devine-Wright et al., 2010; McNair et al., 2011,
see). In Ofgem’s economic analyses for example customer preferences are assumed homogeneous within
dnos. In this paper we show that this is a critical and questionable assumption that is likely to lead to
an inefficient level of service provision. We illustrate that if heterogeneity in valuations is not accounted
for when determining the allowances, the transition of utilities to a socially efficient service level and a
welfare maximising payment plan might be distorted.
We present an alternative, less restrictive approach to explore customer preferences and wtp for
resilience services. We account for preference heterogeneity in the population, allow for scale heterogeneity
(i.e. heterogeneity in the randomness of choice) and exploit individual posterior distributions to improve
the wtp estimates and thus the economic valuations. More precisely, we start off with the estimation
of a heterogeneous scale mixed logit model in wtp space, derive the individual posterior distributions
based on the individuals’ choices and exploit them to segment the data post estimation to calculate the
total valuations per dno. We refer to ‘posterior analysis’ in the sense that we analyse the conditional
estimates that exploit information on the choices made by the individuals. The results of different types of
posterior analysis are discussed. We demonstrate the practical relevance of this new estimation strategy
based on a discrete choice experiment that informed the fifth distribution price control review (dpcr5)
in the uk. In our empirical analysis the valuations for undergrounding of overhead lines and for the
resilience to storms are in focus. However, the approach is equally applicable to any other stated choice
experiment set up to inform incentive regulation. Our approach is straightforward to implement, could
1
2 HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES FOR ELECTRICITY SERVICES
improve policy evaluations and foster more efficient incentive setting.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background on the relevance of customer
heterogeneity for incentive regulation. Section 3 presents the econometric model. Section 4 describes the
data that underlies the discrete choice analysis. Section 5 provides empirical evidence of the merits of
our estimation strategy. Section 6 offers some policy implications and section 7 concludes.
2 Heterogeneous Preferences for Electricity Services
The transmission system in the uk comprises over 25,000 circuit km overhead and about 2,000 circuit
km underground lines. The distribution system adds further 845,000 circuit km, of which around 525,000
circuit km are underground cables and 310,000 circuit km are overhead lines (Energy Network Association,
2014). Transmission involves long distance transportation of electricity at high voltage, distribution
refers to the transportation of low voltage electricity through local networks. There are two Transmission
System Operators (tsos) and fourteen Distribution Network Operators (dnos) in the uk. They run
the electricity networks and are regional monopolies. Ofgem regulates these monopoly companies and
determines the allowed revenue that can be earned during the price control period. The challenge is to
set the allowances such that the optimal service level is provided. tsos and dnos set their business plans
against the price controls. More background on the incentive schemes in the uk can be found in the
Appendix.
The empirical analysis of this paper focuses on incentive regulation of services delivered by dnos.
dnos are responsible for wires and cables, for restoring the power supply in case of power cuts, con-
necting customers to their local network, ensuring the right voltage gets to business and consumers and
for investigating any complaints that customers have regarding their electricity distribution service for
example. They charge the electricity suppliers for the use of the network and the suppliers in turn charge
their customers the total cost for all elements in the supply chain. In the uk the distribution component
makes up about sixteen percent of a customer’s bill (Ofgem, 2014). The dnos hence have an indirect
relationship with the customers and the regulator has to ensure that the dnos don’t exploit their price
setting power, but charge reasonable prices. There is evidence that dnos differ in their customer base
and there is also substantial customer heterogeneity within dnos. This heterogeneity exists in multiple
dimensions such as location, urbanisation, grid resilience, the percentage of overhead lines, the exposure
to flood and storm risks and is likely to be reflected in different valuations for resilience services. Elec-
tricity North West for example states in its investment plan for the dpcr5: ‘We cover a diverse range of
terrain and customer mix from isolated farms in Cumbria to areas of heavy industry, urban populations
and city centers’ (Electricity North West, 2008).
For several reasons the understanding of customer preferences for electricity services and how they
vary across customers can inform grid infrastructure planning. Despite being essential for a reliable and
resilient grid based on renewables, the related investments are often met by costly public opposition.
The main issue is that more reliable and resilient networks benefit a country as a whole, but costs and
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benefits are not imposed on all customers to the same degree and depend on the service provided. Some
investments in infrastructure impose costs such as reduced property prices, visual amenity and tourism
on only few, e.g. on those households along the lines (Tobiasson et al., 2015). Other investments such
as the undergrounding of overhead lines imply positive externalities for customers along the lines, but
might not be equally valuable for customers further away from the lines.
In an empirical study of public beliefs about electricity supply networks Devine-Wright et al. (2010)
find strong public support for placing new power lines underground, regardless of the cost.1 Respondents
currently living within sight of infrastructure were significantly more likely to strongly support under-
grounding regardless of cost, in comparison to those who did not live in sight of such infrastructure. But
there has been no further investigation of the wtp for undergrounding in the uk. McNair et al. (2011)
were the first to explicitly estimate an average wtp for undergrounding using data from established res-
idential areas in Canberra, Australia. They show that there is significant variation in preferences in the
population, but employ a standard binary logit model due to data constraints (McNair et al., 2011). Soini
et al. (2011) analyse the heterogeneity of energy landscape perceptions using a latent class method to
identify different types of customers. They find significant heterogeneity of perceptions, which has impli-
cations for the planning, public communication and participatory approach related to grid infrastructure.
More generally, Soini et al. (2011) find that knowledge concerning power lines significantly increased the
probability of positive perceptions and reduced the probability of negative perceptions. There is also
some evidence to suggest that public support for new power lines is higher when individuals believe that
such lines will deliver electricity from renewable energy sources (Saint Consulting, 2009). And along the
lines of previous research, the wtp for undergrounding or other kinds of investment in resilience might
be higher, if customers understand that the new infrastructure serves a less carbon intense, renewable-
based electricity grid. Existing research evidently supports our argument that the consideration and
understanding of heterogeneity in wtp can be essential for infrastructure planning and public policy
making.
Despite the evidence of heterogeneity in preferences and wtp for electricity services, in Ofgem’s
economic analyses customer preferences are assumed homogeneous within dnos. We show that this is
a critical and questionable assumption that is likely to lead to an inefficient level of service provision.
Along the lines of Jamasb et al. (2012), who derive the welfare losses due to incorrect estimation of the
marginal cost curve of quality improvements, we argue that refining demand (wtp) estimates by taking
preference heterogeneity into account can increase welfare. Jamasb et al. (2012) find that the rpi-x
incentive scheme did not provide sufficient incentives to improve reliability. Assuming a constant wtp
they show that refined estimation of marginal cost curves for the uk electricity dnos can increase welfare.
In contrast to Jamasb et al. (2012), we take the marginal cost curve as given and illustrate how imprecise
estimation of wtp can lead to welfare losses. If, for example, the regulator overestimates the value of grid
resilience due to over-simplified assumptions on customer preferences, the investments in infrastructure
1According to estimates of National Grid undergrounding a typical 400kV double circuit power-line will cost 12 to 17
times as much as installing the same line overhead.
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and thus service quality might be pushed beyond the optimal level. That is, the transition to a socially
efficient service quality level and a welfare maximising payment plan might be distorted. We present a
new approach to achieve more reasonable wtp estimates.
2.1 Welfare Implications of Heterogeneous Preferences
dnos provide services with public good characteristics (such as undergrounding) as well as some services
with private good characteristics (such as customer care in case of blackouts). We therefore do not only
consider the efficiency and welfare implications of different assumptions on preference heterogeneity, but
also investigate how the implications of our estimation strategy differ depending on the type of resilience
service provided.
First, public goods and services are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption, but customers
might differ in their wtp for them. Undergrounding for example is a service to all customers, improving
among others the resilience of the grid. But as it also improves the visual amenity, it might be particularly
valuable for customers living close to the lines. Comparably, the valuation of resilience to storms might
be relatively more important to customers living in areas with high storm risk.
Allocative efficiency of public goods and services provision is achieved when the social marginal benefit
equals the social marginal cost i.e.
N∑
i=1
WTPi = MC. The optimality condition holds regardless of the
social welfare function (swf).2 In cases of public goods and services, correct estimation of the aggregated
wtp is therefore crucial to achieve allocative efficiency: more precise estimation of the mean and hence
total vertically aggregated wtp affects whether the respective public service improvement is evaluated
as economically viable or not.
Distributive efficiency of public goods and services provision can be achieved by optimising the pay-
ment plan. Given the optimal quantity of the service, i.e. a pareto-optimum, there will always be a
payment plan that maximises the respective swf. The challenge is to find this plan. Different social
welfare functions consider different distributions of wealth optimal. With a traditional utilitarian (Ben-
thamite) social welfare function for example, which is simply the sum of the individual’s utilities (i.e.
W =
N∑
i=1
ui), distributive efficiency is reached when those who value the public service most pay most for
its provision. For a more general welfare function that assigns different weights (i.e. W =
n∑
i=1
aiui) or a
Rawls’ welfare function for which the welfare only depends on the lowest utility (i.e. W = min{u1...un}),
different payment plans would be optimal. As the optimal payment plan depends on the preference
distribution in the population, distributive efficiency can be improved by exploiting the individual wtp
distributions - for any swf. We hence argue that the individual wtp distributions can be exploited
to inform the optimal payment/compensation plan. Since in the case of public goods and services all
consumers have to consume the same quantity, the individual wtp cannot be exploited to differentiate
who receives the service.
Second, regulated private services, i.e. excludable and rivalrous services, could be services such as
2Whether the condition is fulfilled depends on the initial distribution of wealth, if the wtp is a function of income.
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customer connections to the local network, customer consultation and technical assistance in times of
blackouts or the number of minutes lost in blackouts. These are all services that need not be provided to
the customers to the same degree. With the development of smart grids that allow more customer-specific
contracting and imply the decentralisation of the electricity system, service differentiation is likely to play
a more prominent role. For such differentiable services more accurate estimation of the individual wtp
distributions can improve both allocative and distributive efficiency: the aggregate demand curve now
results from a horizontal aggregation of the individual valuations. While the homogeneous valuations
assumed in the mnl model imply a perfectly elastic demand curve, the consideration of heterogeneous
individual wtps allows for a downward sloping demand curve, which is illustrated in figure 1. The wtp
is a downward sloping function of service quality.
Allocative efficiency of private goods and services is achieved when the horizontally aggregated wtp
equals the mc. Correct estimation of the individual level wtp is therefore important to achieve allocative
efficiency: more precise estimation of the individual level and hence horizontally aggregated wtp affects
whether the respective service level is economically viable or not.
Distributive efficiency is achieved when the swf is maximised. An analysis of the individual wtp
distributions makes it possible to not only determine the efficient level of output, but also to provide
them such that the swf is maximised (i.e. inform who should receive the service and who should pay for
it). Providing the same service quality to all customers is not necessarily welfare maximising. If agents
have heterogeneous preferences, they will want to trade away from a uniform distribution, which is an
argument for a differentiation of service quality. While some consumers might ceteris paribus accept a
lower degree of supply reliability (e.g. because they hardly use any electric appliances at home), others
might be willing to pay for a higher degree of supply reliabilty. Another example is the service provided
by call centers: while some customers might value the availability of customer support, others might
not be willing to pay for it. Thus, in case of private services, the individual wtps can be exploited to
determine not only who should pay for the services, but also who should receive them.
In this context it needs to be considered that the wtp for service quality is likely to be positively
correlated with income. Providing the goods and services preferrably to those with the highest wtp
is therefore prone to social equality concerns. To address such potential social equality concerns, a
minimum level of service, e.g. for fuel-poor households, should be guaranteed. The choice of the social
welfare function shall not be the focus of this paper. However, conditional on income, services with
private good characteristics could be provided to those who are willing to pay most, which could improve
distributive efficiency.
In summary these considerations illustrate that not only the social optimal level of service might be
distorted, but that also the payment plan and the distribution of the services (in the case of regualated
excludable and rivalrous services) is likely to be inefficient, if customer heterogeneity is not taken into
account. In our empirical analysis we thus distinguish between implications of preference heterogeneity
for allocative and distributive efficiency in case of both regulated public and private services. In the case
of public services only the aggregate wtp matters for allocative efficiency and the individual level wtps
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Figure 1: Welfare Loss from Misspecification of Demand (wtp)
Figure 1 illustrates the potential welfare loss from misestimation of wtp
in case of regulated private goods. The horizontal summation of het-
erogeneous individual wtps leads to a downward sloping, rather than
totally elastic, demand curve. As the efficient service level lies where
demand intersects with marginal cost, misspecification can lead to ineffi-
cient service levels. Moreover, distributional efficiency can be distorted,
if the heterogeneous valuations are ignored.
can mainly inform the welfare maximising payment plan. In the case of private services on the other
hand, the individual wtps can improve both allocative and distributive efficiency.
3 Econometric Model
In the following three subsections we introduce the econometric model underlying our estimation strategy.
We first present a mixed logit model that is flexible in the sense that it can accommodate random
preference and scale parameters and allows for different types of scaling. We then introduce the concept
of wtp space models. In the last part of this section we discuss the potential of posterior analysis to
refine and explore wtp estimates and their heterogeneity in the context of different types of electricity
services.
3.1 Flexible Mixed Logit Framework
In discrete choice modelling the researcher estimates the probability (rather than quantity) of choice using
the random utility model (rum). The aim is to study how multiple consumer and product attributes
jointly affect choices and to estimate implicit prices not only for the bundled service, but also for its
different attributes. Consider N consumers i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N , J choice alternatives j = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., J and
T choice situations t = 1, 2, 3, ..., T . In the rum consumer i chooses product j to maximize his utility
that is affected by L individual and K product characteristics. Let there be unobserved heterogeneity
that can capture why customers with similar observable characteristics might still make different choices
and why products with similar observable characteristics might still have different market shares. Let dij
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be an indicator for consumer i choosing alternative j. The probability that customer i buys alternative
1 then
Pr(di1 = 1) = Pr(Ui1 > Ui0 ∩ ... ∩ Ui1 > UiJ) (1)
Let the utility be separable in price and non-price attributes and consider the following traditional utility
specification underlying the logit model in preference space:
Uijt = αpjt + ω
′vjt + ijt (2)
α = α0 +α1xit (3)
ωk = ω0k + ω
′
1kxit ∀k = 1...K (4)
where pjt measures the price or cost of alternative j and vjt is a (K × 1) vector of observable non-price
attributes. α and ω are vectors of attribute coefficients to estimate. ijt is an independent and identically
distributed (iid) random term that captures unobserved characteristics and follows a standardised type
I extreme value distribution with constant variance V ar(ijt) = (pi
2/6). While in a traditional multi-
nomial logit (mnl) framework the individual’s choice only depends on individual characteristics, xit,
the conditional logit (cl) framework also includes alternative specific characteristics, vjt, in the utility
function. However, many papers, including ours, refer to the cl model as the mnl model with the under-
standing that individual and alternative specific characteristics are allowed in the response probability
(Wooldridge, 2010).
A more generalised utility specification in preference space is given as
Uijt = αipjt + ω
′
ivjt + σ
−1
i ijt (5)
αi = α0 +α1xit + ν1it (6)
ωik = ω0k + ω
′
1kxit + ν2ikt ∀k = 1...K (7)
where αi and ωi are now individual specific vectors of attribute coefficients to estimate. The error term is
scaled and has variance V ar(σ−1i ijt) = (pi
2/6σ2i ). 1/σi can capture individual heterogeneity in the error
variance. (ν1it,ν2it) are random components that follow a multivariate distribution to be specified by
the researcher and capture unobserved individual characteristics. Equation 5 nests several models that
differ with respect to their flexibility to accommodate parameter heterogeneity.
Imposing the restrictions ν1i = ν2i = 0 and σi = 1 on equation 5 leads back to equation 2, which is
the utility specification underlying the mnl model: the vectors α and ω are restricted to be homogeneous
conditional on xit and the error variance is restricted to be constant across individuals and equal to
V ar(ijt) = (pi
2/6). As shown above, the mnl model can introduce heterogeneity in the marginal effects
of observed product attributes, so-called preference heterogeneity, by including interactions of attribute
and individual characteristics (e.g. vkjt × xit) into the utility function. One major challenge is, though,
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to determine which demographics matter for which attributes and in which combination. While the
log-likelihood of different specifications can provide insights which demographics are relevant, it is often
infeasible to consider all possible interactions. And even if all relevant interaction terms were included,
this would imply a loss of a large number of degrees of freedom. A second way to introduce preference
heterogeneity into the mnl framework is to presume specific customer groups and estimate segmented
mnl models on those. Drawbacks of this approach are subjectivity with respect to the segment definition
and small sample sizes that hamper robust estimation.
A less restrictive model than the mnl model is a random parameter model that accommodates prefer-
ence heterogeneity resulting from both observable and unobservable alternative characteristics, but still
constrains the error variance to be constant, i.e. σ = 1. In such a mixed logit (mxl) model the preference
parameters αi and ωi are functions of observable individual specific characteristics (as before) and of
an additional unobserved random error term, νikt that follows a continuous distribution. These mixing
distributions are to be specified by the researcher. While the mxl model can accommodate any kind
of multivariate distribution of the preference parameters, analysts frequently impose univariate normal
distributions. The price parameter is often assumed to follow a log-normal distribution. The researcher
then estimates the hyper-parameters of the coefficient distributions such as mean and variance.3 In such
mxl models, customers with the same observable characteristics (i.e. conditional on xit) may hence still
value product characteristics differently.
Especially when estimating wtps, a normality assumption imposed on the marginal utility coefficients
in preference space comes along with problems resulting from the unbounded nature and the symmetry
of the normal distribution. Hess (2010) points out that it is often not clear whether the findings actu-
ally reflect the true underlying heterogeneity in the data or are simply a result from the distributional
assumptions. More flexible mixing distributions that do not rely on strict symmetry assumptions and
allow bounds on either side can have significant advantages over more assumption-bound counterparts.
More flexible models are often more difficult to estimate, though, with convergence issues and problems
with parameter significance (Hess, 2010). When choosing the appropriate model researchers thus have to
trade-off the cost and benefits of working with more flexible mixing distributions. However, all parametric
models rely on distributional assumptions which can lead to considerable estimation bias, if they are not
fulfilled Fosgerau (2006).
An alternative to imposing parametric distributions is the use of semi- or non-parametric distribu-
tions. While usually more computationally costly, such models are less restrictive and have recently
gained increasing attention from choice modellers (e.g. Garcia (2005); Fosgerau (2007); Li (2011); Fos-
gerau (2014)). Fosgerau (2007), for example, uses a range of non-parametric techniques to examine the
specification of a model to evaluate the wtp for travel time changes. Fosgerau (2014) refers to non-
parametric approaches in the sense that the discription of some unknown distribution is non-parametric
and is embedded in an otherwise parametric model, with this combination hence being semi-parametric.
3In the case of a multivariate normal distribution, (ν1i,ν2i) ∼ MVN(0,Σ) where Σ denotes the covariance matrix of
the preference parameters αi and ωi.
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He highlights that there are situations in which it is not desirable to impose a specific functional form,
e.g. if the distribution of wtps is to be inferred from the data. And Li (2011) points out that although
the Gumbel distribution is a good approximation in some applications, it is chosen mainly for mathe-
matical convenience and can be restrictive in many scenarios. He relaxes the assumption of the Gumbel
distribution to include a large class of distributions that allow heteroscedastic variances and derives a
semi-parametric choice model. We do not perform any non-parametric estimation, but this could be part
of further research.
Instead, we test parametric mixed logit models that accommodate mixing distributions that differ
in their flexibility and parameter space. As mentioned above, the mixed logit model can accommodate
mixing distributions of any kind. While researchers usually assume homogeneous error variances, the
model can also accomodate a utility specification that allows the error variance to vary across individuals
i, with V ar(σ−1i ijt) = pi
2/6σ2i . The heterogeneous error variance is motivated by the argument that
a significant part of the heterogeneity retrieved in random coefficient models might actually be due to
scale rather than preference heterogeneity. Sources of scale heterogeneity can be manifold, among them
heterogeneous experience with the object of interest that leads to heterogeneous randomness of choice.
In our application, previous experience with power cuts due to extreme events such as floods or storms
is likely to reduce the randomness of customers’ choices for example. The unobserved σi can capture
such factors that are uncertain from the decision maker’s view rather than only from the researcher’s
perspective. A random scale parameter is thus conceptually different from a random preference parameter.
A simple reparameterisation, multiplying equation 5 by σi, yields a model that allows for separate
random preference and scale parameters:
Uijt = (σiαi︸︷︷︸
λi
)pjt + (σiω
′
i︸︷︷︸
c′i
)vjt + ijt (8)
As in equation 2 the idiosyncratic error term in this parameterisation follows an extreme value type I
distribution with constant and standardised variance again (V ar(ijt) = pi
2/6), the model in equation 8
can hence be estimated like the mxl model in equation 5. In specification 8 the attribute coefficients are
now the product of two independently distributed separate coefficients. However, while the existence of
scale heterogeneity has been widely acknowledged in the literature, specification 8 also illustrates that αi
and ωi cannot be separately identified from σi (Hess and Rose, 2012). Some normalisation is therefore
necessary.
To illustrate the identification problem we follow Hess and Rose (2012). In a case in which λi and
ci are considered attribute coefficients, they are directly estimated based on a mixed logit framework
where scale is normalised to 1 (λi = αi and ci = ωi). If there was scale heterogeneity, this model
that just considers λi and ci could not distinguish the variation resulting from scale from preference
heterogeneity; they are confounded. Even a model that considers the attribute coefficients as products
of two components that follow separate distributions (σi×αi) and (σi×ωi) does not separately identify
the preference and scale parameters. In fact, a model that allows for correlation between λi and ci is
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structurally equivalent to a model that considers αi, ωi and σi separately, provided that λi and ci follow
the same distributions as the products (σi × αi) and (σi × ωi), respectively.
The so-called generalised multinomial logit (gmnl) model, first proposed by Keane and Wasi (2013)
and operationalised by Fiebig et al. (2010) and Hensher and Greene (2011), incorporates a separate
random scale parameter in addition to the random preference parameters. Distributions are imposed on
both preference and scale coefficients. Fiebig et al. (2010) extend the parameterisation of the individual
specific parameters in the gmnl model from ci = (σiωi) to
ci = σiω¯ + [γ + σi(1− γ)]νi (9)
σi = exp(σ¯ + τ0,i) (10)
where νi follow a multivariate normal distribution (νi ∼ MVN(0,Σ)). 0,i follows iid standard
normal distributions such that the parameter σi is log-normally distributed (σi ∼ logN(σ¯i, τ)) where
σ¯ and τ are the location and scale parameter respectively. The mean of this log-normal distribution is
E(σi) = exp(σ¯ +
τ
2
). Therefore setting σ¯ = −τ
2
2
normalises E(σi) to 1, which is done for identification.
A parameter τ significantly different from zero indicates significant heterogeneity in σi. γ is a weighting
parameter that determines in how far only the mean (ω¯) or also the random component of the preference
parameter (νi) is scaled. The full gmnl model, where γ ∈ [0, 1], allows for differential scaling of β and
νi. If γ = 1 and τ 6= 0, only the mean preference parameter is scaled (i.e. ci = σiω¯ + νi). This model is
called gmnl-i and adopts the prior that the individual level parameters ci follow a mixture of normals
with different means but equal variances (namely the variance of νi). In gmnl-ii, γ = 0 and τ 6= 0 and
hence ci = σi(ω¯+νi) so that the standard deviations are proportional to scale. gmnl-ii adopts the prior
they are a mixture of normals with proportionally different means and standard deviations (Fiebig et al.,
2010). This view is consistent with the traditional view of scale that considers the entire utility function
being scaled. Whenever γ > 0, the scale parameter does not represent scale in its traditional sense, which
is an additional argument to not claim identification of scale heterogeneity. Instead, we emphasise that
gmnl is a specific form of the mixed logit specification with flexible mixing distributions. And gmnl still
accommodates the possibility to impose the necessary restrictions to achieve low computational costs and
convergence, in our case γ = 1.
As Hess and Rose (2012) show, various model specifications can merely be seen as different parame-
terisations of the mixed logit model and any gains in fit obtained in random scale models are the result
of more flexible distributions than they are frequently imposed. As an example, the gmnl specification
nests the logit models discussed above. If V ar(νi) = 0 and σi = 1, the mnl model results. If V ar(νi) = 0
and σi 6= 1 the model turns into the so-called scaled multinomial logit (s-mnl) model. This leads to the
case mentioned above, where the preference parameters α and ω are assumed constant and uncorrelated,
but λi and ci are by construction perfectly correlated through σi. Any parameter heterogeneity discov-
ered might result from preference heterogeneity that the model fails to capture. Vice versa, if λi and ci
are independent, the scale parameter is assumed to be constant, leading back to a mxl model without
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heterogeneous scale. In such a model any parameter heterogeneity discovered might result from scale
heterogeneity that the model fails to capture. If λi and the components of ci vary with less than unit
correlation, αi and ωi are necessarily varying in addition to scale, but the types of variation cannot be
disentangled. We follow the interpretation of Rose et al. (2012) that the gmnl formulation allows the
attribute coefficients, here λi and ci, to follow flexible mixtures of distributions (e.g. of log-normal and
normal distribution), which does not necessarily imply separate identification of preference and scale.
However, as we argue below, if the model is correctly specified, the estimation in wtp space rather than
in preference space can yield unconfounded wtp estimates, while the price coefficient remains confounded
by scale.
3.2 Models in WTP Space
If the mixed logit model is specified in preference space, the distributional assumptions are imposed on
the preference (and scale) parameters. The wtp for an attribute j is derived from the ratio of that
attribute’s parameter to the price parameter. The ratios of the random parameters can produce extreme
and unreasonable ranges of valuations and might bias the estimated means (Hess, 2007; Daly et al., 2012).
Depending on the distribution imposed on the coefficients, the wtp distributions may or may not have
finite moments. Daly et al. (2012) present a theorem that allows researchers to test whether the moments
of the wtp distribution exist and suggest several ways to ensure finite moments of wtps.
One straight forward way to address the issue of undefined moments of wtp and ensure finite moments
is to reparameterise the model such that the distributional assumptions can be imposed directly on the
wtps and their moments estimated directly from the data as suggested by Train and Weeks (2004).
Rearranging equation 8 and re-parameterising yields the heterogeneous scale mixed logit model in wtp
space:
Uijt = (σiαi︸︷︷︸
λi
)[pjt + (ω
′
i/αi︸ ︷︷ ︸
w′i
)vjt] + ijt (11)
This model is theoretically equivalent to the model in preference space, but the re-parameterisation
implies differences in the ease of implementation of different distributions. In wtp space, for example,
it is straightforward to impose normal distributions on the wtps. Any differences in model fit compared
to models estimated on the same data in preference space are mainly a result of the distributional
assumptions imposed on the parameters. If (λiwi) in wtp space follows the same distribution as (σiωi)
in preference space, model fit should be the same.
Equation 11 also illustrates that the scale parameter σi does not directly impact the wtps, but is
picked up separately by λi, i.e. by the price coefficient in wtp space. Differences in wtp estimates
between models that do and do not include a random scale parameter are thus the consequence from any
impacts that the inclusion of the scale parameter has on the remaining model parameters (Hess, 2007), in
our case on the price coefficient in wtp space. λi incorporates any differences in scale across respondents
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(Train and Weeks, 2004). αi and σi are not separately identified. Any changes in the distribution of
λi = αiσi implicitly impacts the distribution of the preference parameters which in turn impacts model
fit.
As in preference space, specification 11 nests multiple models that depend on the restrictions imposed
on the parameters. We impose the constraints on the coefficients as discussed and listed in table 1. The
first column of table 1 lists the model names, the second column the equivalent names of the nested
models, column three indicates whether the model constraints the scale parameter to be constant (σ = 1)
or not (σi). The fourth column indicates whether the model allows for random preference parameters
(V ar(vi) = 0) or not (V ar(vi) 6= 0) and the last column summarizes the model by listing the expected
utility in wtp space.
Model M2, the mnl model in wtp space, can be obtained by imposing the restrictions σ = 1 and
V ar(νi) = 0. Since the scale parameter is normalised to 1, α can be retrieved from the coefficient of
the constant. In M3, which is equivalent to the s-mnl model, the constant picks up λi = (σiα). With
the normalisation of Fiebig et al. (2010) that E(σi) = 1, α can be derived in expectation: E[σiα] = α.
M4, the mxl model in wtp space, on the contrary allows for random preference parameters, but imposes
the restriction σi = 1. As in mnl, αi can be backed out from the constant. The specification in 11 also
nests models that allow for correlated preference coefficients. Since in such models Cov(ν2iktν2ilt) 6= 0
for any k,l the correlation of preference parameters translates into a correlation of wtp estimates. If all
covariances are unconstrained, this requires estimation of a large number of additional parameters and
comes along with the loss of a high number of degrees of freedom.
Assuming that the true model does include a separate random scale parameter as in equation 11,
i.e. with E(U) = (σiαi)[pjt + (ω
′
i/αi)vjt] and the idiosyncratic error follows an extreme value type
I distribution, the estimates resulting from the models that constrain either of the parameters to be
constant, will be confounded due to misspecification in at least one dimension. When assuming a constant
preference parameter α for example, any variation captured by σi can also result from variation in αi
that the constrained model fails to capture. If the model is misspecified, the distributional assumptions
imposed on the parameters are wrong. λi and ci will in truth follow the product of the two distributions of
σi and αi and σi and ωi respectively. Moreover, if a relevant scale parameter is omitted, a homoscedastic
variance is imposed on a heteroscedastic one. This results in confounded mean estimates, as the extreme
value type I distribution is necessary for unconfounded estimation.
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Table 1: Models in WTP Space - Summary
Model Equivalent σi V ar(νi) E(Uit) in gmnl form
M2 mnl 1 0 (σα)[pjt + (ω
′/α)vjt]
M3 s-mnl σi 0 (σiα)[pjt + (ω
′/α)vjt]
M4 mxl 1 6= 0 (σαi)[pjt + (ω′i/αi)vjt]
M5 gmnl-i σi 6= 0 (σiαi)[pjt + (ω′i/αi)vjt]
The table lists all models in wtp space. Model M2 is the baseline model
in wtp space, M3 only allows for heterogeneous scale, M4 only for pref-
erence heterogeneity, M5 allows for preference and scale heterogeneity.
We constrain γ = 1 in all models, reflecting a prior that the individual
level parameters follow a mixture of normals with different means but
equal variances.
3.3 Conditional Distributions
Our approach is based on the premise that there exists heterogeneity in preferences and valuations for
grid resilience across customers. This provides direct motivation for the use of a random coefficient model
that combines a standard conditional logit kernel with a mixing distribution of any kind (e.g. log-normal,
normal or the product of both). In the first step of the estimation we abstract from covariates and
estimate the hyperparameters of the preference distribution in the population for each attribute. Letting
ω denote a vector of random parameters, let g(ω|η) represent this distribution, with hyperparameters η.
A limitation of such an approach that relies on the unconditional distributions is that they represent
random taste heterogeneity in the population. This implies that although relative to the conditional
logit model we have information on the variance around mean parameters, we are not able to locate
any individuals within the distribution. Following Train (2003) and further work by Hess (2010) and
W.H. Greene (2005), analysts have addressed the related limitations by working with the conditional
distributions, say g(ω|yi), where yi is a T ×1 vector denoting the sequence of choices made by individual
i. Conditional distributions allow to infer the most likely position of each sampled individual on the
distribution of sensitivities or valuations exploiting the information on their choices made. Let the
conditional density g(ω|yi) be
g(ω|yi) = L(yi|ω)f(ω|η)∫
ω
L(yi|ω)f(ω|η) dω , (12)
where L(yi|ω) denotes the likelihood of observing this sequence of choices given ω. Since the denominator
of 12 has no closed form solution, estimation via maximum likelihood is not possible. However, the
conditional distributions can be simulated. Replacing (12) by a discrete approximation, the conditional
mean for consumer i for example may be written as
Êi(ω) =
ΣRr=1L(yi|ωr)ωr
ΣRr=1L(yi|ωr)
, (13)
where ωr are independent multi-dimensional draws from f(ω|η) at the estimated values for η. This
conditional mean can be interpreted as the most likely value for a consumer i whose choices yi were
13
3 ECONOMETRIC MODEL
observed. Our estimation strategy utilises the conditional distribution g(ω|yi) to compute customer-
specific estimates of mean wtps and then aggregates these by dno. We thus derive the conditional
means of the coefficient distribution for the sub-group of individuals who face the same alternatives and
make the same choices (Train, 2003).
There are a number of advantages of conditional distributions both in preference and wtp space.
Firstly, since the number of choices made is finite, outlier problems can be reduced (Hess, 2010). This
is not only important when estimating wtps in preference space where the wtps are derived as ratios
from estimated coefficients, but also in wtp space, where potentially unbounded mixing distributions can
result in misleading estimates. Further merits of using the conditional distributions are that posterior
analysis can be conducted, linking the conditional estimates back to socio-demographics and that more
substantial tests of coefficient correlations are possible (Hess, 2010). We perform classical simulation
rather than Bayesian, but refer to ‘posterior analysis’ in the sense that we explore the conditional estimates
derived based on the individuals’ choices. We relate the conditional mean estimates back to individual
characteristics with the aim to shed light on different consumer types in the sample. In this context
we distinguish two components of the total variance of the conditional distribution: the variance of the
individual-level conditional means (the between variation) and the variance around these means (i.e.
the within variance). If the between variance captures a sufficiently large share of the total variation
in a coefficient, the individual conditional means have potential to be useful in distinguishing customers
(Train, 2003). Train (2003) discusses the possibility to employ cluster analysis based on conditional mean
estimates in order to respecify the model towards different segmentation.
We combine the advantages of the estimation in wtp space with the merits of the conditional distri-
bution g(ω|yi) to compute the aggregate wtps by dno. gmnl in wtp space as specified in (11) serves as
a flexible main model framework as it nests models with and without preference and scale heterogeneity,
can accommodate correlated coefficients and allows to impose distributional assumptions directly on the
wtps. Moreover, it allows for the derivation of individual-specific posterior distributions, the individual
posterior means in particular. This can shed light on the different segments and sources of heterogeneity
without assuming them a priori. In our empirical application the key aim of the individual level posterior
analysis is to refine the estimated aggregated valuations per dno and to exploit the distributions for more
effective payment plans and distribution of services.
An alternative approach to the use of conditional distributions proceeds by extending the conditional
logit model by utilising a dno indicator to construct a linear index which allows for dno specific mean
parameters. This approach accommodates variation in wtp between dnos but not within. We note that
in a world in which the regulator faces a large sample for each dno (e.g. 1,000 observations or more) it
would be possible to combine this multiplicative index with a random coefficient model. Although such
an approach has a number of advantages, the cost of the respective stated choice experiments would be
significantly higher and we note that such a model generates a proliferation of both mean and covariance
parameters.
14
4 DATA
4 Data
Discrete choice modelling is useful for the estimation of the wtp for goods and services, to derive demand
and consumer surplus as well as for optimum pricing. In fact, the exploration of customer preferences and
estimation of wtp via stated choice experiments has become an important part of price review processes
of regulators such as Ofgem in the uk. To demonstrate our suggested new approach to estimate reasonable
wtp distributions we use the stated preference survey ‘Expectations of dnos & Willingness to Pay for
Improvements in Service’ (Accent, 2008), which was conducted for Ofgem in 2008 and informed the
price control period from 2010 until 2015. One of the objectives was to determine domestic and business
customer priorities and wtp for investments by the dnos. The survey was conducted with 2,002 customers
belonging to the fourteen British dnos (around 150 customers per dno). Customers were explained what
dnos are and what they do. They were shown a showcard illustrating that dnos own the wires and cables,
have the duty to connect any customer requiring electricity within their area, maintain the connection
and must maintain an efficient cost-effective and coordinated system to distribute electricity, e.g. the
overhead lines. They were then confronted with three choice experiments that each included six choice
tasks related to grid reliability and resilience. A questionnaire accompanying the experiments asked
for (rather few) further customer characteristics: dno, rural or urban living environment, age, income,
electricity usage level, bill, power cut experience.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
dno - - 1 14 2,002
Annual Electricity Bill (£) 527.58 382.81 24 8400 2,002
Dummy Rural Area 0.266 0.442 0 1 2,002
Dummy Fuel Poor 0.157 0.364 0 1 2,002
Dummy Power Cut Experience, past 3 yrs 0.516 0.500 0 1 2,002
Dummy Unplanned Cuts (past 12 months) 0.462 0.499 0 1 2,002
Number Unplanned Cuts (past 12 months) 0.897 1.636 0 30 1,985
Length (min) Unplanned Cuts (past 12 months) 88.277 264.234 0 4320 2,002
Dummy Planned Cuts (past 12 months) 0.073 0.260 0 1 2,002
Number Planned Cuts (past 12 months) 0.087 0.353 0 5 1,999
Length (min) Planned Cuts (past 12 months) 6.347 39.007 0 480 1,988
Table 2 (and H.1 in the Appendix) summarise the main statistics of the 2,002 customers in the
sample.4 The average annual electricity bill across customers and dnos was £527, but varied from a £24
to £8,400. Around a quarter of customers indicated to live in rural areas and about 16 percent were
fuel poor (i.e. their energy expenditures made up more than ten percent of their income). The median
social class was class C1 and 81 percent of the customers were class C1 or below. The median income
lay between £20,000 and £30,000 (see table H.1 in the Appendix). 30 percent had children under five
years and 60 percent of the sample were under 50 years old. 51 percent of the sample had some power
cut experience in the past twelve years (around 46 percent experienced unplanned cuts and only seven
percent experienced planned cuts). The number of experienced unplanned cuts in the past 12 months
ranged from zero to 30, with an average of 0.90. The number of planned cuts only ranged up to five and
had a low average of 0.09. The length of the unplanned cuts was on average 88 minutes, but reached
4We exclude edf London from our analysis, as the experiment differed for this dno.
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up to 4320 minutes (i.e. 72 hours). The median length of experienced unplanned blackouts was zero,
the 75 percentile was 45 minutes and 10 percent of the sampled customers experienced unplanned cuts
that lasted longer than 3 hours. The average length of planned cuts was 6 minutes and the maximum
experienced length was 480 minutes (i.e. 8 hours). These numbers indicate that most customers in the
representative sample had no or little experience with blackouts, but that there were some customers
who experienced remarkable interruptions of services.
Since Accent’s (2008) study consisted of three separate experiments on resilience services, packaging
effects must be considered: the three lower level experiments can lead to an excessive value of wtp for all
improvements (due to so-called budgeting or halo effects). Accent (2008) found that Experiment 3 needed
smaller package adjustment than the other experiments, which makes it best suited for separate analysis.
We thus use Experiment 3 to explore customer preferences and wtp for resilience of the electricity grid
and to illustrate the improvements that our approach can deliver compared to the workhorse models used
by regulators to date.
The attribute levels in Experiment 3 were defined as deviations from the status quo and are listed
in table 3. The four considered non-price service attributes are: (1) commitment to undergrounding
of overhead lines in areas of outstanding natural beauty and national parks for amenity reasons (with
a status quo of 1.5 percent per annum across the uk and levels ranging from zero to five percent per
annum), (2) the number of customers affected by blackouts due to major storms (with dno specific status
quo and levels ranging from twenty percent less to twenty percent more customers being affected), (3)
the number of major electricity sites across the uk exposed to potential flood risk (with status quo of
1,000 sites and levels ranging from 1,000 to 850 sites)5 and (4) the investment (by distributor) to current
mobile generation equipment and vehicles to reduce CO2 emissions (with levels indicating zero, five or
ten percent of replacement). The change in cost was also defined relative to the current customer bill and
the absolute change (reflecting the change in the distribution component) ranged from a bill reduction
by £183 to an increase by £457. An example of a choice card can be found in figure 5 in the Appendix.
Table 3: Attributes and levels as defined for the choice experiment 3 (Accent, 2008).
Attribute # of levels levels
Commitment to undergrounding 4 0%, 1.5% (as now), 3%, 5%
Customers affected by major storms 5 +20%, +10%, as now, -10%, -20%
Sites exposed to flood risk 4 1,000 (as now), 950, 900, 850
Investment to reduce CO2 emissions 3 as now, replace 5%, replace 10%
% change in annual electricity bill6 9 +30, +25, +20, +15, +10, +5, 0, -5, -10
Table 3 lists the attributes and levels of resilience services as considered in Experiment 3 (Accent, 2008).
All changes in the attribute levels were defined relative to the status quo.
As described above, many of the attribute levels were based around the status quo service level
for a particular dno. Since the general public was considered mostly unfamiliar with their electricity
distribution service quality, one of the choice alternatives showed all attributes at their current levels
and the respondents current bill. In this way, respondents were reminded of what service they currently
5An increasing environmental risk with climate change is flooding from river or coastal sources. Since many major sites
are located close to the water for cooling purposes, programs to improve resilience to floods are increasingly needed.
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pay for. This inclusion of the status quo alternative was also meant to bring more realism to the choice
exercises, allowing respondents to indicate that they would stay with their current service (Accent, 2008).
Nevertheless, while not the focus of this research, several potential shortcomings could result from this
experiment. As it is a stated choice experiment on electricity services that have relatively abstract
public good characteristics, strategic and/or hypothetical biases might impact the wtp estimates. Some
consumers might strategically make their choices to indicate a low wtp for resilience in order to avoid
potential future tax increases for example, leading to strategic bias. And hypothetical bias might result
from the abstract nature of the experiment, its attributes and levels. Moreover, the experimental design
could be improved by implementing d-efficient rather than fractional factorial design for example. Efficient
designs aim to result in data that generates parameter estimates with as small as possible standard errors.
If some prior information about the parameters is available (e.g. from a pilot study), the asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix can be determined. Hence, whenever there is any prior parameter information
available (even if just the signs of the parameter), the experimental design could be improved by the use
of an efficient design.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Model Specification
We start off with the premise that the customer base is not only substantially heterogeneous across but
also within dnos. This heterogeneity can exist in multiple dimensions such as location, urbanisation,
resilience of the grid, the percentage of overhead lines, the exposure to flood and storm risks etc. and is
likely to be reflected in different valuations for electricity services.
Ofgem’s workhorse model is the mnl model. Heterogeneity is (in some cases) introduced by segmented
estimations (e.g. by income groups or dno). However, while Ofgem sets company specific price caps,
the assumption of homogeneous preferences within dnos is sustained. This assumption of homogeneous
preferences within dnos is problematic. Moreover, this approach is challenged by small (sub)sample sizes
that can lead to convergence and robustness issues.
Our model flexibly allows for both heterogeneity across and within dnos without presuming any
segments a priori. That is, we do not segment our estimations along socio-demographic characteristics.
While we stay agnostic about the sources of heterogeneity in the data, we need to specify how the
attributes and levels enter the utility function. We test two linear in parameter specifications. They
are discussed below. In all considered specifications we distinguish wtp from wta to test whether
the valuation of an improvement of a service differs significantly from the valuation of an equivalent
deterioration. We argue that there is reason to suspect an asymmetry in the wtp and wta, because
most dnos have a very high reliability and resilience: with the status quo reliability of 99.99 percent
a customer experiences a power cut every two years. Customers might thus only be willing to pay a
fairly small amount for further improvement, while the compensation they require for a deterioration of
reliability (i.e. the wta) is likely higher. This could reflect the behavioural economic concept of loss
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aversion for example. We de facto consider improvement and deterioration as different attributes.
In a first specification (Dummy Model) we consider the valuations for different levels of the attributes
separately, working with a large set of dummy variables. As an example, in the Dummy Model the wtp
for a 10 percent reduction of customers affected by major storms is measured by a separate parameter
than the wtp for a 20 percent reduction of customers affected by major storms. Column 1 in table
4 lists the estimates resulting from a mnl estimation of the Dummy Model. The vector of attribute
variables is v = (ASCA,ASCB,D0%ug, D3%ug, D5%ug, D−20%sd, D−10%sd, D+10%sd, D+20%sd, ...). We
omit the indices for simplicity. Two alternative specific constants are included to control for a suspected
preference of customers for the status quo alternative. One asc dummy indicates option A, the other
option B. A positive coefficient of the alternative specific constant A (ASCA) for example demonstrates
the underlying preference for choosing alternative A over and above any value that is associated with the
service attributes. A negative coefficient does indicate a status quo effect. With 1.5 percent being the
status quo of overhead line conversion to underground lines per annum. The dummy D0%ug indicates that
the offered alternative involves no undergrounding (1.5 percent less than to date). We expect a negative
wtp, i.e. a wta, for such reduced undergrounding activity. The dummy D3%ug measures improvements in
undergrounding activity from 1.5 to 3 percent. The dummy D5%ug separately indicates an improvement
from 1.5 to 5 percent. The dummy D−20%sd indicates if the number of customers affected by storm
damages due to black outs is reduced by 20 percent and the dummy D−10%sd indicates the respective 10
percent improvement of resilience. The dummies D10%sd and D20%sd indicate the respective deterioration
of resilience and so forth. We would expect a positive coefficient for all dummy variables that indicate
improved resilience and negative coefficients for all dummies indicating deterioration. Incorporating
separate dummy variables for all different service levels becomes rather a burden, if there is little variation
in the respective levels. Moreover, since the valuations of the different levels of any attribute are likely to
be correlated, correct model specification is likely to require the estimation of the respective covariances,
implying large variance-covariance matrices and a loss of degrees of freedom.
A straight forward way of simplification is linearisation of the levels that implies a constant marginal
utility from incremental service improvements. In a second specification (Linearised Model) we therefore
partly linearise the model, e.g. we assume that the wtp for resilience to storms is linear in the percentage
changes. This implies, for example, that the customers’ valuation of a 10 percent improvement is half as
high as their valuation of a 20 percent improvement. The observed utility of customer i for option j for
the linearised model is specified as:
Vjit = αpipjt + ωASCji + ω1ilessundergdjt + ω2imoreundergdjt
+ω3ilessstormsjt + ω4imorestormsjt + ω5ilessfloodsjt + ω6ilessCO2jt (14)
Where αpi and ωji are parameters to be estimated from the data and
vjt = (ASCjt, lessundergdjt,moreundergdjt, lessstormsjt,morestormsjt, lessfloodsjt, lessCO2jt) is a vector
of alternative specific attributes. As in the Dummy Model, two alternative specific constants are included
to control for a suspected preference of customers for the status quo alternative. With 1.5 percent being
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the status quo of overhead line conversion to underground lines per annum, the variable lessundergd
indicates if the offered alternative involves no undergrounding (1.5 percent less than to date). The
variable moreundergd is a categorical variable that measures improvements in undergrounding activity to
3 percent and 5 percent. Given the linearisation, the specification imposes the same coefficient for the 1.5
percent improvement as on the subsequent 2 percent increase in undergrounding activity. The variable
lessstorms is a categorical variable that measures the reduction of storm damages (hence improvements of
resilience to storm). It indicates whether 10 percent or 20 percent less customers are affected by blackouts
due to major storms. The variable morestorms indicates the respective deterioration of resilience. The
variable lessfloods is a categorical variable that indicates the number of major electricity sites exposed to
flood risk (1,000 being the status quo). Finally the variable lessCO2 indicates the percentage of current
equipment and vehicles that is replaced with those using less polluting fuels. We expect a positive
coefficient for all variables that indicate improved resilience and negative coefficients for all dummies
indicating deterioration. The assumption of linearity in levels can lead to confounded estimated means,
if the wtp does not increase linearly with the attribute level.
We test the two models based on a simple mnl estimation with the aim to choose one preferred
specification. We thereby face a trade-off: on the one hand the Dummy Model does not constrain the
valuations of the levels of an attribute to be linearly or otherwise related and can hence capture the
preference heterogeneity more generally. On the other hand it is computationally more burdensome
to relax the parameter restrictions and allow for random and possibly correlated parameters. The more
parsimonious linearised model, on the other hand, has less coefficients to estimate than the Dummy Model
and avoids by construction the estimation of preference correlations between the levels of any attribute.
Only correlations across attributes need to be considered, which reduces the number of parameters to
estimate significantly.
Table 4 lists the results of the mnl estimation for the two specifications. We report cluster robust
standard errors that take the panel nature of the data (i.e. potential clustering on the respondent level)
into account. The Dummy Model provides insights in how far the linearisation of valuations for different
attribute levels is justified. For undergrounding, the marginal wtp seems to be decreasing in the level
of undergrounding, while the marginal valuations of improved storm resilience seem to be constant (i.e.
customers indeed value a 20 percent improvement twice as much as a 10 percent improvement). Model fit
as measured by ll as well as by aic and bic is better when controlling for each attribute level separately,
as it is the case in the Dummy Model.7 However, due to the relative ease of implementation our preferred
specification is the Linearised Model. This specification implies few additional parameters to estimate,
is less computationally intensive than the Dummy Model and by construction less prone to correlation
of the coefficients.
The Linearised Model assumes a utility that is linear in the attribute levels, but distinguishes wtp
from wta. In the following sections, all estimations are based on this linear specification. However, we
7As we calculate cluster robust standard errors, likelihood ratio (lr) tests are not meaningful. However, we also estimate
the models without robust standard errors and perform the lr test based on these. The Dummy Model, i.e. the unrestricted
model in which the linearised model is nested, is supported by the lr tests.
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Specifications
(1) (2)
Dummy Linearised
Dummy no undergd -0.349∗∗∗
(0.0464)
Dummy 3% undergd 0.270∗∗∗
(0.0456)
Dummy 5% undergd 0.362∗∗∗
(0.0461)
Dummy 20% more storm damage -0.531∗∗∗
(0.0524)
Dummy 10% more storm damage -0.364∗∗∗
(0.0505)
Dummy -10% less storm damage 0.184∗∗∗
(0.0484)
Dummy -20% less storm damage 0.313∗∗∗
(0.0496)
Dummy less flood risk (-50 sites) 0.229∗∗∗
(0.0440)
Dummy less flood risk (-100 sites) 0.162∗∗∗
(0.0432)
Dummy less flood risk (-150 sites) 0.246∗∗∗
(0.0451)
Dummy 5% less CO2 0.561∗∗∗
(0.0415)
Dummy 10% less CO2 0.680∗∗∗
(0.0435)
Less undergd (∆ = −1.5%) -0.369∗∗∗
(0.0447)
More undergd (∆ = +1.5%) 0.180∗∗∗
(0.0228)
More storm damage (∆ = +10%) -0.267∗∗∗
(0.0251)
Less storm damage (∆ = −10%) 0.170∗∗∗
(0.0237)
Less flood risk 0.0639∗∗∗
(0.0140)
Less CO2 0.327∗∗∗
(0.0211)
Change in bill -0.0859∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗∗
(0.00309) (0.00309)
ASC A -0.766∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗
(0.0670) (0.0585)
ASC B -0.908∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗
(0.0671) (0.0586)
Observations 36036 36036
LL -10757.913 -10791.898
AIC 21545.8 21601.8
BIC 21673.2 21678.2
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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test models that differ in the manner in which unobserved heterogeneity is accommodated: depending
on the model we allow for constant/random coefficients, homogeneous/heterogeneous scale, uncorre-
lated/correlated coefficients. This enables us to explore the sensitivity of the estimates to the respective
assumptions. We a) estimate the population moments, b) derive the individual level valuations (their
means and variances) and c) examine these posterior valuations by dno and other population segments.
5.2 Flexible Mixed Logit in WTP Space
For the official report Ofgem conducted the estimations partly on the whole sample and partly segmented
by dno. Based on the examination of cross-tables, the data was split further where significant differences
in valuations were suspected. A problem with this segmented estimation is the small sample size, which
hampers robust estimation, especially when estimating more complex models such as mxl or gmnl. The
price coefficient might be insignificant and differential price sensitivity (e.g. by income) might not be
identifiable when estimating the models for each dno separately. Aggregation of the data can therefore
be particularly important for the estimation of sensitivity to price. Since only about 150 customers were
observed per dno, we perform pooled estimation across all customers and dnos.
To obtain baseline estimates that are comparable to those of Ofgem, we first estimate a multinomial
logit model (mnl) in preference space (M1). The wtp values are derived as ratio of any attribute
coefficient ωk to the price coefficient α. Table 5 lists the estimated valuations from this baseline model.
They are very close to those reported by Ofgem. As an example, while our baseline model suggests a
wtp of £2.11 for an increase in undergrounding by 1.5 percent per annum over the five year price control,
Ofgem’s research indicated a wtp of £2.29 per annum. Under our linearity assumption, we also get a
very similar value for the increase in undergrounding activity from 1.5 to 5 percent per year: while our
mnl estimate suggests a wtp of £4.22, Ofgem estimates the value to be £4.36. When estimating the
mnl model in wtp space (M2) the estimated wtps correspond to those in M1. This equivalence between
the models in preference and wtp space holds because all coefficients are constant.8 The mnl model is
easy to implement, but due to its restrictive nature likely to be misspecified. A mistakenly omitted scale
factor for example implies that the heteroscedastic error variance is not accounted for. In the logistic
choice models considered here, this leads to biased estimates in addition to wrong standard errors.
Table 5: wtp (£per annum) for attribute k derived from mnl in preference space
(M1) as ratio
ωk
α
1.5% less 1.5% more 10% less 10% more less flood less CO2
undergd undergd storm dmg storm dmg risk
wtp (£p.a.) -4.32 2.11 1.99 -3.13 0.75 3.83
lower limit -5.37 1.58 1.44 -3.72 0.43 3.31
upper limit -3.26 2.65 2.54 -2.54 1.07 4.35
The table lists the wtp estimates (and estimated standard deviations) as resulting from the baseline
mnl model, which assumes that all customers have the same wtp and don’t differ in their randomness
of choice. The values correspond closely to those of Accent (2008).
As argued in section 3, random parameter models with flexible mixing distributions can have sig-
8The price coefficient in M2 can be retrieved from the constant as −exp(−2.461) = −0.085.
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nificant advantages over more assumption-bound specifications. More flexible models are often more
difficult to estimate, though, with convergence issues and problems with parameter significance (Hess,
2010). When choosing the appropriate model, researchers have to trade-off the costs and benefits of
flexible mixing distributions.
We test a range of random parameter models, among them a heterogeneous scale mixed logit model
(exploiting the gmnl specification) that can accommodate a random scale parameter. We clearly dis-
tinguish the ability to accommodate a random scale parameter in the model from the ability to identify
this parameter. Compared to the mnl model our main model specifications relax the restriction on the
scale parameter (M3, the smnl model), allow for random preference parameters (M4, the mxl model)
and a combination of both (M5, the heterogeneous scale mixed logit or gmnl model), respectively. We
abstract from models that additionally allow for coefficient correlations which go beyond the correlation
implied by the scale parameter.
We consider different distributional assumptions for the valuations. Due to their unboundedness to
at least one side, both normal and log-normal distributed model parameters can result in unreasonably
large estimates for some share of decision makers.9 And both types of distributions come with further
drawbacks: while the normal distribution may give rise to the wrong parameter sign, at least for some
respondents (see Ghosh et al., 2013), the log-normal distribution has zero probability mass at zero.
The log-normal assumption is therefore not suitable for modelling situations where a section of the
population is indifferent to an attribute (see Rigby and Burton, 2006; Train and Sonnier, 2005). Since
the attribute levels of interest are quite abstract in this experiment, some customers might find it difficult
to relate to the attributes (e.g. to electricity sites exposed to flood risks or the number of customers
affected by storms). We thus expect some of the customers to be indifferent and hence avoid the log-
normal distribution and its inability to capture indifference for the valuation parameters. Moreover,
log-normal distributions also frequently come along with estimation challenges and lastly, we do not want
to pre-impose a parameter sign in cases in which it is unambiguous whether people are wtp or require
compensation for the respective attribute. Undergrounding of overhead lines, for example, might be of
value to some, but not to other customers. For these reasons we assume normal rather than log-nornal
distributions for all wtps and wtas. However, we assume a log-normally distributed scale parameter
(σi ∼ logN) and the distribution of the price coefficient in wtp space depends on the model specification
(λi ∼ logN or λi = (σi × αi) ∼ (logN × logN)).
Moreover, for the reasons outlined in section 3, all models are estimated in wtp space. We rely on
the gmnl framework in wtp space, imposing the respective constraints as listed in table 1. The gmnl
model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (sml), which maximizes the marginal likelihood
function after integrating over heterogeneity distributions. The pooled estimation imposes the restriction
of constant tastes across replications for the same respondents. We estimate the model with different
starting values to ensure that the global maximum has been reached.
Since the more flexible models come at the cost of increased computational burden, our estimation
9The long tail of the log-normal distribution for example often generates a large range of implausible wtp estimates.
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strategy trades-off the benefits of model flexibility (such as better model fit and more realistic wtp
distributions) against the cost (such as convergence issues and computation time). To achieve convergence
of the random parameter models, we set γ = 1, which gives further reason to not claim identification of
scale in the traditional sense. γ = 1 reflects the prior that the individual level parameters follow a mixture
of normals with different means but equal variances rather than variances that are scaled proportionally.
Table 6: Homogeneous Preference Parameter Models (M1-M3)
M1 M2 M3
gmnl specification mnl-pref. space mnl-wtp space smnl-wtp space
Change in bill -0.0853∗∗∗
(0.00309)
ASC A -0.628∗∗∗ -7.358∗∗∗ -2.969∗∗∗
(0.0585) (0.660) (0.437)
ASC B -0.771∗∗∗ -9.038∗∗∗ -3.581∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.667) (0.443)
Less undergd (-1.5%) -0.369∗∗∗ -4.318∗∗∗ -2.016∗∗∗
(0.0447) (0.512) (0.329)
More undergd (+1.5%) 0.180∗∗∗ 2.111∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.262) (0.167)
Less storm damage (+10%) 0.170∗∗∗ 1.992∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.270) (0.188)
More storm damage (-10%) -0.267∗∗∗ -3.128∗∗∗ -2.286∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.287) (0.199)
Less flood risk 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗
(0.0140) (0.166) (0.104)
Less CO2 0.327∗∗∗ 3.830∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗
(0.0211) (0.233) (0.154)
[Het] const -2.461∗∗∗ -1.616∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0550)
τ 0 1.366∗∗∗
(.) (0.0511)
Observations 36036 36036 36036
LL -10791.9 -10791.9 -10221.44
AIC 21601.8 21601.8 20462.9
BIC 21678.2 21678.2 20547.8
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 6 lists the results of models with homogeneous preference parameters. M3 allows
for scale heterogeneity. All estimated mean valuations have the expected and intuitive
signs and significance. The significant scale parameter τ suggests that models M1 and
M2 are misspecified and the means hence confounded as these models do not take the
heteroscedastic error variance into account. Model fit is improved when increasing model
flexibility via the introduction of the random scale parameter.
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Table 7: Random Parameter Models (M4, M5)
M4 M5
gmnl specification (wtp space) mxl gmnl-i
Mean
Change in Bill 1 1
ASC A -4.691∗∗∗ -1.860∗∗∗
(0.601) (0.354)
ASC B -6.401∗∗∗ -2.444∗∗∗
(0.605) (0.350)
Less undergd (∆ = −1.5%) -3.545∗∗∗ -1.941∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.290)
More undergd (∆ = +1.5%) 1.962∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.161)
Less storm damage (∆ = −10%) 1.777∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.174)
More storm damage (∆ = +10%) -3.506∗∗∗ -2.052∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.175)
Less flood risk (∆ = 50 sites) 0.493∗∗ 0.295∗∗
(0.172) (0.0948)
Less CO2 (∆ = 5%) 3.172∗∗∗ 1.340∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.148)
[Het] const -2.004∗∗∗ -1.019∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0551)
τ 0 1.343∗∗∗
(0.0478)
SD
ASC A 0.884∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(0.0729) (0.0895)
ASC B 0.831∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
(0.0800) (0.107)
Less undergd (∆ = −1.5%) 1.130∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(0.0772) (0.0946)
More undergd (∆ = +1.5%) 0.670∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗
(0.0578) (0.0682)
Less storm damage (∆ = −10%) 0.613∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(0.0569) (0.0697)
More storm damage (∆ = +10%) 0.610∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(0.0623) (0.0802)
Less flood risk (∆ = 50 sites) 0.390∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0436)
Less CO2 (∆ = 5%) 1.000∗∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗
(0.0447) (0.0591)
Observations 36036 36036
LL -9758.9 -9136.9
AIC 19551.7 18309.9
BIC 19696.1 18462.8
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7 lists the results of the models with random parameters.
All estimated mean valuations have the expected and intuitive
signs and significance. The significant standard deviations and
scale parameter τ suggest that models M1, M2 and M3 are mis-
specified: the means are confounded as these models do not take
preference heterogeneity and/or heteroscedastic error variance into
account. Model fit is improved when allowing for more flexible dis-
tributions to model the parameter heterogeneity.
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Table 6 lists the results of the mnl in preference and wtp space and of the smnl model in wtp
space. Table 7 lists the results of the models with random preference and scale parameters. We do
not allow for correlated coeffcients to avoid increasing complexity and computational cost of the model.
Across all models signs and significance of the estimated mean valuations are consistent and in line
with expectations. Consumers have a preference for the status quo alternative, which is reflected by the
significant negative coefficients of both ascs. As indicated by the negative wtp coefficients, consumers
need to be compensated in case of service deterioration such as in case of less undergrounding activity
or if more households are affected by blackouts due to storms. On the other hand, consumers are
willing to pay for increased undergrounding activity, for improved resilience to storms and floods and for
more investment (by distributor) to current mobile generation equipment and vehicles to reduce CO2
emissions, which is reflected in positive and significant estimated coefficients. Moreover, as suspected,
we find significant differences between the wtp and the wta (in absolute terms): customers are willing
to pay less for a given service improvement than they would need to be compensated for in case of
the equivalent service deterioration. While the baseline model (5) yields a wtp for an additional 1.5
percent of undergrounding per annum of £2.11 for example, the compensation required for 1.5 percent
less undergrounding than the status quo (i.e. the wta) is more than twice as large, namely £4.32. The
same holds for the preferences for storm damages: while customers are willing to pay £1.99 for 10 percent
less customers being affected by major storms, the wta 10 percent more customers being affected is about
£3.13. This finding is consistent with some degree of loss aversion of the consumers.
Despite correct signs and significance of the estimated means across all models, the estimated val-
uations differ in magnitude. This results from the different assumptions imposed on the parameter
heterogeneity and hence the flexibility of the models. In wtp space the wtps are unconfounded by
scale, but since the scale parameter is confounded with the price parameter, differences in the estimates
across models are a consequence of the impact that the inclusion of the additional parameter has on the
remaining model parameters (Hess and Stathopoulos, 2013).
Moreover, the estimated standard deviations in the random preference parameter models are all
significant (see table 7). The parameter heterogeneity impacts not only the distribution, but also the
estimated mean valuations: when comparing mnl (M1 and M2) with mxl (M4) for example (both
with constant scale), the estimated means differ. They are lower (in absolute terms) for all attributes
apart from the wta more storm damages. The significant heterogeneity in M4 might also be caused by
heterogeneous scale that the model fails to capture, but the findings support the hypothesis of substantial
parameter heterogeneity in the data and render the constant preference parameter models (M1, M2, M3)
misspecified.
Furthermore, models that take scale into account and thus allow for the more flexible mixing dis-
tributions result in attenuated mean estimates. As discussed in section 3, omitting the scale parameter
from the model can lead to biased estimated means if there is heteroscedasticity. The results of the smnl
model in wtp space (M3) as well as of the model with random preferences and scale heterogeneity (M5,
M7) suggest that the more flexible model is reasonable: the coefficient τ is highly significant. However,
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building on the argument made in section 3, part of the heterogeneity captured by the scale parameter
in the smnl specificaiton (M3) might equally result from heterogeneity in the preference parameters that
the distribution imposed fails to capture. If the covariances of all attributes and the ascs in our model
were unconstrained, this would imply the estimation of 28 additional covariance parameters and hence
loss of 28 additional degrees of freedom. As these models are computationally burdensome, we abstract
from these models in this analysis.
Given the discovered parameter heterogeneity and the computational burden of models with correlated
coefficients, model M5 seems superior. This is supported by the model’s fit: not only is the fit improved
when moving from preference to willingness to pay space, but also when including preference and scale
parameters separately. We report the final log-likelihood (ll), the Akaike Information Criterion (aic)
and the Bayesian Information Criterion (bic) in table 8. Comparing these measures of fit for two models
estimated on the same data set allows the statistical significance of new model coefficients to be assessed
and to inform model selection. While adding parameters increases the absolute value of ll it can result
in overfitting. Both aic10 and bic introduce a penalty term for the number of parameters in the model.
Models with the lower aic or bic have better fit among this finite set of models.
Firstly, models that allow for heterogeneous preference parameters (αi and ωi) improve the bic by
around 2,000 points: while the bic resulting from the mnl models (M1 and M2) is 21,678.2, the bic in the
mxl model improves to 19,696.1 (i.e. by 1,982.1). Comparably, when comparing the models that include
a separate scale parameter the bic of 20,553.8 resulting from the smnl model with random scale but
constant preference parameter (M4) improves to a bic of 18,462.8 for the gmnl-i model that allows for
random preference parameters in addition to random scale (M5) (improvement by 2,091). We also find
that, ceteris paribus, the bic is improved by around 1,200 bic points when the random scale parameter is
incorporated. Comparing the bic of mnl in wtp space (M2) with the bic of smnl (M3) and comparing
the bic of mxl (M4) to the bic of gmnl-i (M5) illustrates how the introduction of the parameters σi
and τ leads to a better fit even when employing fit statistics that penalise the introduction of additional
variables. gmnl-i (M5) has better fit as a result of separating out scale and the fact that the distribution
of σi × ωi (M5) is different from the distribution of ci (M4). In summary, bic improves the more flexible
the model is: both, allowing for random preference as well as scale paramter improves model fit.
The incorporation of the scale parameter improves the model fit, despite the wtp estimates being
not directly impacted by scale. This is a consequence of the more flexible mixing distributions in models
that include a separate scale parameter. The flexibility of the mixed logit model increases with the
introduction of random parameters, a separate scale parameter and relaxed restrictions on the covariances.
The improvements in model fit obtained by using a specification that allows the attribute coefficients to
be the product of two separate and independently distributed coefficients are hence likely due to the fact
that this more flexible distribution better explains the behaviour in the data. Gains in fit resulting from
the inclusion of σi result at least in part from this increased flexibility.
11
10aic = 2k − ln(L) and bic = −2ln(L) + kln(n).
11Any improvements of fit when moving from a model in preference to willingness to pay space on the other hand can
be explained by the different assumptions imposed on the coefficients. If we imposed the distributional assumptions in
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Table 8: Measures of Fit
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
LL -10791.9 -10791.9 -10224.4 -9758.9 -9136.9
AIC 21601.8 21601.8 20468.9 19551.7 18309.9
BIC 21678.2 21678.2 20553.8 19696.1 18462.8
The table lists ll, aic and bic for all estimated models as they
result from models estimated with 2,000 Halton draws. It shows
that more flexible models that take preference and scale hetero-
geneity into account fit the data better. aic and bic penalise the
introduction of additional parameters to avoid overfitting, but
still indicate better fit for the more flexible models. Incorporat-
ing a scale parameter has a particularly prominent impact on
model fit.
The differences in fit between models arise in the ease in which given distributional shapes can be
accommodated, with advantages for different specifications in different settings (Hess and Rose, 2012).
In models in which the distributional assumptions are imposed such that the models have the same
flexibility, model fit should be the same. As an example, M4 and M5 would be formally equivalent if
ci = (σi × ωi) and both σi and ωi were assumed to be distributed such that the product followed the
same distribution as ci. Model fit would be the same. We hence conclude that scale matters and should
be included in the model to accommodate flexible distributions, but that the scale parameter cannot be
separately identified. In preference space all mean coefficient estimates will be confounded by scale and
in wtp space the price coefficient will be confounded.
A further criterion to evaluate the models, is the probability of sign reversal. For any attribute k,
with ωki ∼ N(µωk , σ2ωk) standardisation yields zωki =
ωki − µωk
σωk
∼ N(0, 1). Thus, the probability of
a valuation being negative can be calculated as given in equation 15. We find that a disadvantage of
model specifications incorporating scale is that the probabilities of sign reversal are slightly higher than
in models without random scale (see table 9). Alternative distributions imposed on the coefficients (e.g.
skewed distributions or distributions with positive or negative support) placed on the coefficients might
reduce these issues of sign-reversals.
P (ωki < 0) = P (zωki <
−µˆωk
σˆωk
)∀ k (15)
preference space such that the ratio of the attribute to the cost coefficient follows the same distribution as the valuations
in wtp space, the same model fit would result in preference and wtp space. This is demonstrated in the most simple form
with the equivalence of model fit of mnl in preference and wtp space (M1 and M2, respectively).
27
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 9: Probabilities of Sign Reversal
M4 M5
gmnl specification mxl gmnl-i
ASC A 0 0.046
ASC B 0 0.003
Less undergd (-1.5%) 0.001 0.09
More undergd (+1.5%) 0.002 0.191
More storm damage (+10%) 0 0.005
Less storm damage (-10%) 0.002 0
Less flood risk 0.103 0.264
Less CO2 0 0.142
Table 8 lists the probabilities of unexpected sign as
resulting from the random parameter models M4 and
M5. The model that allows for preference and scale
heterogeneity (M5) results in the highest probability
of sign reversal. While fit was best for M5, the higher
probability of of sign reversal can be seen as a disad-
vantage of the more flexible model.
5.3 A Priori Assessment of Preference Heterogeneity
The estimated models revealed significant heterogeneity in valuations. However, all random parameter
models abstract from the sources of heterogeneity, but capture it entirely in the random parameters in the
model. To shed light on the drivers of the revealed heterogeneity, we also test models with interactions
of attribute and respondent characteristics. Major challenges and drawbacks of such models are the
difficulty to select the appropriate interactions a priori and the increased complexity of the model as the
number of included variables increases. However, simple mnl models with interaction terms of attribute
and respondent characteristics can provide us with first insights into the drivers of heterogeneity.
We test the interactions of income with all attributes. Of particular interest are the interactions
of the cost variable with the income variable. These can reveal whether significant income effects are
present. We find significant positive coefficients of the cost-income interactions. These imply that higher
income consumers’ utility is less senstitive to price than lower income consumers. Since the wtp for
different attributes are derived as ratio of attribute coefficient to the cost coefficient, a heterogeneous
cost sensitivity implies heterogeneous valuations across income groups. A lower price sensitivity for
higher income consumers ceteris paribus implies they have a larger wtp and lower wta. Moreover, the
two significant positive coefficients of the CO2-income interactions imply that higher income consumers
experience a higher sensitivity to carbon reductions than lower income consumers. However, albeit
significant, the differences in valuations are very small. Table 10 lists the results of the mnl model with
the cost-income interactions, illustrating the heterogeneity in cost sensitivities.
We also test mnl models with interactions of the attributes with the respondents’ job, age, power cut
experience and fuel poverty category and select those interactions that are significant. The results of the
specification with likely relevant interactions are listed in table H.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 10: MNL with price income interactions
MNL
Cost (£) -0.129∗∗∗
(0.00964)
ASC A -0.633∗∗∗
(0.0592)
ASC B -0.772∗∗∗
(0.0592)
Less undergd -0.375∗∗∗
(0.0449)
More undergd 0.181∗∗∗
(0.0230)
More storm damage (+10%) -0.272∗∗∗
(0.0253)
Less storm damage (-10%) 0.169∗∗∗
(0.0238)
Less flood risk 0.0670∗∗∗
(0.0140)
Less CO2 0.334∗∗∗
(0.0213)
CostXinc2 (£10k - £20k) 0.0348∗∗
(0.0114)
CostXinc3 (£21k - £30k) 0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0127)
CostXinc4 (£31k - £40k) 0.0589∗∗∗
(0.0118)
CostXinc5 (£41k - £50k) 0.0768∗∗∗
(0.0120)
CostXinc6 (£51k - £60k) 0.0870∗∗∗
(0.0145)
CostXinc7 (> £60k) 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0126)
CostXinc8 (refused) 0.0253
(0.0146)
CostXinc9 (NA) 0.0286∗
(0.0124)
N 36036
The reference category for income is the group with less than £10k p.a.
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4 Posterior Analysis & Primary Results
To estimate the dno specific price caps, most estimations conducted for Ofgem are segmented by dno and
based on small samples of only 150 customers per dno. The segmented estimation would be more robust
with larger samples (e.g. 1,000 observations per dno), but this would increase the cost of the respective
experiments significantly. In the previous section we introduced an alternative approach to allow for
heterogeneity in valuations, namely the introduction of attribute-covariate interaction terms. We also
pointed out the drawbacks that come along with such an approach. To address the challenges associated
with an a priori segmentation or selection of interaction terms, we now investigate heterogeneity based
on segmentation post estimation.
We perform pooled estimation across all observations and segment the estimated individual condi-
tional mean valuations post estimation. First, we investigate the properties and merits of the estimated
conditional distributions along the lines of Hess (2007): how reasonable are the posterior distributions
compared to the estimated distributions? What is the importance of between and within variation? How
do the probabilities of unexpected signs and the preference correlations compare? Second, we employ two
types of posterior analysis to investigate posterior mean differences in valuations and respondent charac-
teristics: are there any meaningful links of the individual level conditional valuations to socio-demographic
attributes or correlates of scale such as previous experience that can help to identify different segments
of respondents? Third, we shed light on three individual customer profiles, exploiting the full individual
level conditional distributions, and fourth, investigate preference correlations. Finally, we combine our
findings to derive aggregate valuations within and across dnos.
5.4.1 Posterior Mean Distributions
For all estimated random parameter models the means of the individual conditional means are very close
to the corresponding estimated unconditional population means, i.e.
1
NR
N∑
i=1
R∑
r=1
WTPir ≈ µˆ. And as
expected the posterior standard deviations of the conditional means (i.e. the variation of the conditional
mean valuations between individuals) are smaller than the estimated standard deviations σˆ as the latter
also includes the variation around the individual conditional means. Table 11 lists the means of the
individual posterior means, their respective between standard deviations, their extreme values across all
dnos as derived from the estimated means (µˆ) and the share of the total unconditional variance that is
explained by the variation of the conditional means (
SD
σˆ
) for the preferred random parameter model M5
that flexibly allows for parameter heterogeneity across and within dnos. For comparison, the estimated
means and standard deviations from section 6 are also listed.12
The variation of the individual level conditional mean estimates only gives a partial representation of
the heterogeneity in the data. It just captures the heterogeneity between respondents, but abstracts from
the variation within individuals. Since the respondents did face a finite rather than an infinite number
of choices, the meaningfulness of the estimated within variation is limited. When arguing whether the
conditional estimates are more or less advantageous than the unconditional ones, a nuanced consideration
12The results of the posterior analysis hold likewise for the random parameter model without separate scale parameter.
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Table 11: Summary statistics of individual posterior distributions across all indi-
viduals and dnos.
M5 Mean (Between) SD Min Max µˆ σˆ
SD
σˆ
ASC A -1.850 0.622 -4.780 0.858 -1.860 1.101 0.56
ASC B -2.463 0.463 -3.948 -0.135 -2.444 0.888 0.52
Less undergd (-1.5%) -1.980 0.882 -5.809 0.600 -1.941 1.448 0.61
More undergd (+1.5%) 0.789 0.501 -1.152 3.009 0.765 0.875 0.57
Less storm damage 0.817 0.458 -0.756 2.712 0.788 0.833 0.55
More storm damage -2.097 0.437 -4.114 -0.362 -2.052 0.793 0.55
Less flood risk 0.297 0.270 -0.801 1.339 0.295 0.467 0.58
Less CO2 1.383 0.867 -1.993 5.083 1.340 1.249 0.69
Table 11 lists the summary statistics of the individual conditional wtp distributions. While
the means of the individual posterior means lie very close to the estimated means, the between
variation of the individual posterior means is smaller than the total variance.
of context and application is therefore needed. In our application the heterogeneity of the individual mean
valuations (i.e. the variation between individual types) is likely to be of most interest to electricity service
providers. Electricity service companies will aim to explore customer heterogeneity, but will be likely to
target the heterogeneity across individual types rather than focusing on the variation within individuals.
They could link the heterogeneity in individual mean valuations back to demographics and in context
of economic viability analyses the individual mean wtps could be re-weighted depending on structural
changes in the population.
The consideration of within and between variation is crucial in light of previous research that finds
that the use of the conditional distributions generates a lower incidence of outliers, and related a lower
incidence of sign violations. Given the use of additional information yi, researchers argue that inference
on mean parameters of the unconditional distribution is more precise when based on the conditional
distributions (Revelt and Train, 2001). However, these statements are based on the consideration of
variances of the conditional means that abstract from the within variation: the variance of the conditional
means is by construction smaller than the unconditional variance, as the latter is equal to the variance
of the conditional means PLUS the variance of the conditional distribution around the individual means.
The smaller standard errors when working with the conditional means is therefore not an indicator for
more reasonable estimates, but rather a result from an exclusion of the variance around the conditional
mean. Whether this is an advantage or disadvantage of the use of conditional distributions depends on
the context and application of interest.
We first calculate the probability of unexpected sign based on the variation of the means, i.e. only
exploiting the between variation. As expected and in line with previous findings such as those of Hess
(2007), the probabilities of sign reversal shrink remarkably (see table 12). This is because the standard
deviations of the conditional means do not take the variation around these means into account. The model
that takes scale heterogeneity into account (M5) still shows the highest probabilities of sign reversal, but
they are much lower than for the estimated population distribution (see table 9).
If the between variance captures a sufficiently large share of the total variation in a coefficient, the
individual conditional means have potential to be useful in distinguishing customers (Train, 2003). Train
(2003) discusses the possibility to employ cluster analysis based on conditional mean estimates in order
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Table 12: Posterior Probability of Sign Re-
versal
M4 M5
gmnl specification mxl gmnl-i
ASC A 0 0.015
ASC B 0 0
Less undergd (-1.5%) 0 0.012
More undergd (+1.5%) 0 0.058
More storm damage (10%) 0 0
Less storm damage (-10%) 0 0.037
Less flood risk 0.013 0.136
Less CO2 (5%) 0 0.054
Table 12 illustrates the reduced posterior prob-
abilities of sign reversal. Even for the flexible
gmnl-i model (M5) the wtp distributions are
tamed.
to respecify the model towards different segmentation. In our application the conditional means capture
between 50 and 60 percent of the sample level heterogeneity (see table 11), which is likely to be large
enough to use this information to distinguish between respondents, e.g. in cluster analysis. We aim to
explore how observed variations in wtp and wta correlate with observed socio-economic and demographic
characteristics, in particular with factors that arguable drive scale heterogeneity.
The posterior analysis also reveals intuitive correlations between valuations both within and across
attributes.13 As an example, within attributes one could expect that customers with a high wtp for
improvement of resilience have a low wta (i.e. require high compensation) for the equivalent deteriora-
tion. ‘Across attributes’ on the other hand, the expected sign of the correlation is not as unambiguous,
but one might expect that customers with high wtp for one attribute do also value closely related or
complementary attributes more. The pairwise correlations of the individual posterior mean valuations as
resulting from our preferred model M5 are listed in table 13. Most have the expected sign and intuitive
and meaningful interpretations. The revealed negative posterior correlation within attributes for example
reflects that customers with a lower wta less undergrounding (more negative coefficient) are expected
to be willing to pay more for more undergrounding activity (more positive coefficient) and customers
who demand higher compensation for more storm damages are also willing to pay more for less storm
damages. The posterior mean correlations suggest a positive correlation across attributes, i.e. customers
who value carbon reductions more, are also willing to pay more for increased undergrounding activity,
greater resilience to floods and storms and are less willing to accept less undergrounding. Most of the
correlations are hence in line with expectations. There are only few exceptions, all related to the wta
more storm damages. There is a negative correlation with the wta less undergrounding and a positive
correlation with more undergrounding. That is, people with a higher wta more storm damages require
less compensation for less undergrounding and are willing to pay less for more undergrounding. This
might indicate customers’ preferences for improvements with the purpose of resilience rather than just
for the sake of natural beauty (which undergrounding might be seen a means for). Posterior analysis has
hence potential to reveal interesting preference relations.
13Since the standard errors are derived from estimates, we focus on the signs of the correlations rather than significance.
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Table 13: Pairwise Correlation of Individual Posterior WTPs - M5.
WTA/WTP... less more less more less less
undergd undergd storm dmg storm dmg flood risk CO2
1.5% less undergd 1
1.5% more undergd –0.30* 1
less storm dmg -0.20* 0.05 1
more storm dmg -0.16* 0.08* -0.04 1
less flood risk -0.21* 0.10* 0.14* 0.12* 1
less CO2 -0.30* 0.12* 0.15* 0.15* 0.14* 1
* p < 0.05
Table 13 illustrates that the posterior analysis reveals meaningful correlations within and
across attributes.
5.4.2 Posterior Tests of Mean Differences
Posterior analysis of the individual level conditional estimates allows to test for and explore heterogeneity
of valuations without an a priori selection of the supposedly relevant interaction terms. The increased
model complexity and the subjectivity implied by the a priori covariate selection can hence be avoided.
We perform two types of posterior analysis: first we test for mean differences in individual level
posterior mean valuations across different covariate categories. E.g. we test whether the valuations differ
across income or job categories. Second, we cluster the individual level posterior mean valuations based on
a k-means clustering algorithm and test mean differences in valuations and in respondent characteristics
across the clusters. E.g. we test whether the mean income differs across the clusters.
First, the posterior tests of mean differences in valuations across covariate categories reveal significant
heterogeneity of valuations across categories. When testing mean differences of individual mean wtps
across income categories for example, we find that the valuations for more and less undergrounding
activity, for less floods damages as well as the valuations for less CO2 vary significantly by income.
Higher income categories tend to have higher valuations. Moreover, apart from the valuations for storm
resilience, all valuations differ across job categories. And the mean valuations across customer groups
with different power cut experience vary significantly for all attributes apart from those regarding less
storm and less flood damages. These findings of the posterior analysis are consistent with the results
of the mnl model with the respective covariate-attribute interactions (see section 5.3). In a simple mnl
specification in preference space the coefficient of the cost-income interactions are significant and result
in higher valuations for higher income consumer categories.
Second, we perform k-means clustering on the estimated individual level posterior mean valuations
to partition the data into clusters, in which each observation belongs to the cluster with the nearest
mean. Several numbers of clusters k were tested. Starting from k = 2 the number of clusters in the
population was increased until significant mean differences in valuations were found. This was the case
for k = 4. We partition the observations into clusters that take all five valuations of an individual
simultaneously into account. This could be of interest when partitioning the customers into groups with
similar preferences for electricity service bundles, as it yields clusters of respondents that are most similar
in their valuations across multiple attributes and would hence be likely to choose similar service bundles.
To relate the clusters of individual posterior valuations back to the customer characteristics we test for
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mean differences in (socio-)economic and demographic characteristics. We find that the customers differ
remarkably across the valuation clusters.14 As an example, the average electricity bill differs significantly
across the valuation clusters. In fact, the mean differences in bill size, socio-economic status, income and
age across the multidimensional valuation clusters are all significant. We also find significant differences
with respect to the respondents’ past experience with power outages. As an example, the experience
with power cuts in the past three years differs significantly across the valuation clusters: respondents
in the cluster with the lowest mean wtp for more and the lowest wta of less undergrounding services
have the least experience with power cuts. Respondents who have not experienced any power outages in
the past seem to not value the electricity services as much as respondents who have already experienced
outages. Table 14 summarises these results from the cluster analysis. yes indicates that the respective
respondent characteristic differed significantly across the four clusters of the posterior attribute valuations.
no indicates that no significant mean differences across the clusters were identified.
Table 14: Mean Differences across Pos-
terior Valuation Clusters
Valuation Clusters (k = 4)
Bill size yes
seg yes
Age yes
Income yes
Fuel Poverty no
Power cut exp. yes
For each attribute the table indicates which
socio-economic and demographic characteristics
differ significantly across the estimated individ-
ual posterior valuation clusters. yes indicates
that the respective respondent characteristic dif-
fered significantly across the four clusters of the
posterior attribute valuations. no indicates that
no significant mean differences across the clus-
ters were idenified.
Such cluster analysis that relates posterior valuations back to respondent characteristics can poten-
tially be used to respecify the model. One possibility would be to estimate the preferred heterogeneous
scale mixed logit specification (here M5) separately on the groups identified through the clustering.
Both types of posterior analysis (testing mean differences in valuations across covariate categories or
testing mean differences of valuations and respondent characteristics across multidimensional valuation
clusters) allow to flexibly test for heterogeneity of valuations, without an a priori selection of the suppos-
edly relevant interaction terms and without increasing model complexity to an unmanageable degree.
5.4.3 Three Customer Profiles
Useful marketing information can be obtained by examining the conditional estimates for each individual.
For this analysis we also estimate the individual posterior standard deviations that are a measure of the
variation around the individual posterior mean. We exemplarily present three customer profiles to illus-
trate the potential of posterior analysis for consumer specific marketing and provision of services. Table
14This is done using Stata’s mvtest means command which performs one-sample and multiple-sample multivariate tests
on means. These tests assume multivariate normality.
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15 lists the posterior means and standard deviations for the three customers along with the probability
of opposite coefficient sign for each valuation and the posterior population means for each attribute.
Customer 1 has a particular high wtp for more undergrounding activity. The respondent also asks
for compensation for less undergrounding, but in contrast to the average customer, his valuations are not
as asymmetric. Only when it comes to storm resilience he asks for a relatively high compensation for
deterioration of the resilience to storms as compared to what he is willing to pay for improved resilience.
Lastly, he is willing to pay more than £2 per annum for CO2 savings. The respondent is above 50,
belongs to the social middle class C1 and has an annual energy bill of £360. He lives in a rural area and
is customer of dno Northern Powergrid. He has not experienced any powercuts in the last three years.
Customer 2 is an example of an individual that is willing to pay for service improvements and asks
for fairly symmetric compensation in case of deterioration. He is willing to pay £1.64 p.a. for more
undergrounding and asks for almost the same amount of compensation in case of deterioration (£1.76
p.a.). He has an above average wtp for improved storm resilience (£2 p.a.), which might be due to
his previous experience with power cuts. Lastly, he has a relatively high wtp for CO2 reductions. The
respondent belongs to the rather deprived social class de and is also above 50 years old. He has an annual
energy bill of £400 and is customer of SSE Hydro.
The third customer lives in a rural area, is above 50 years old and belongs to the upper social class
AB. He has a particularly high wtp for CO2 reductions. He is willing to pay on average £4.2 p.a.. He is
willing to pay about £1 for more undegrounding and slightly less for improved resilience to storms. As
for the average consumer, his wtp for less flood damages is lowest.
With the posterior standard deviations and the distributional assumptions (in our case normality)
we derive the probability that an individual’s valuation is of unexpected sign. This exploits the within
variation. For all three individuals the probability of opposite coefficient sign is close to zero for most of
the considered attributes. Only for services that improve resilience to flooding it is relatively likely that
the individual is in fact not willing to pay.
In summary, we demonstrate that while the posterior means lie very close to the estimated means,
the posterior between standard deviations for the random coefficient models with and without scale are
smaller and the ranges of the valuations consequently more bounded since the variation of the conditional
means abstracts from the variation around the means. In the context of electricity services, this can
prove useful when targeting the preference variation across rather than within consumers. When working
with the posterior distribution there is consequently a lower incidence of sign violations. While the
higher probability of sign reversal appeared to be a disadvantage of the estimated distributions, posterior
analysis can tame the distribution of wtps, even when an already flexible gmnl model with scale is
estimated in wtp space.
5.4.4 Posterior Aggregate Valuations
Given the merits of the conditional distributions, we exploit them to segment the data and derive summary
statistics as well as the total valuations of the different attributes by dno. Exemplary summary statistics
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Table 15: Three Individual Customer Profiles
Customer Profiles 1 2 3
Ei(ASC2) -2.09 -1.37 -0.61
SDi(ASC2) 0.40 0.92 0.51
P(sign reversal) 0% 7% 12%
Ei(ASC3) 0.83 0.58 -0.10
SDi(ASC3) 0.11 0.23 0.05
P(sign reversal) 0% 1% 2%
Ei(less undergd) -2.09 -1.76 -1.65
SDi(less undergd) 0.33 0.61 0.39
P(sign reversal) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ei(more undergd) 2.42 1.64 1.07
SDi(more undergd) 0.58 0.67 0.15
P(sign reversal) 0% 1% 0%
Ei(more storm dmg) -2.06 -2.50 -1.53
SDi(more storm dmg) 0.19 0.47 0.26
P(sign reversal) 0% 0% 0%
Ei(less storm dmg) 0.63 2.06 0.84
SDi(less storm dmg) 0.32 0.91 0.65
P(sign reversal) 2% 1% 10%
Ei(less flood dmg) 0.10 0.27 0.18
SDi(less flood dmg) 0.17 0.23 0.19
P(sign reversal) 27% 12% 17%
Ei(less CO2) 2.82 1.70 4.21
SDi(less CO2) 0.44 1.26 1.34
P(sign reversal) 0% 9% 0%
dno 9 6 9
annual bill 360 400 420
rural yes no no
SEG C2 DE AB
age 50+ 50+ 50+
annual income NA NA 10k - 20k
powercut exp no yes no
Table 15 lists the posterior mean valuations (£per cus-
tomer per year), the posterior standard deviations as
well as individual characteristics. The posterior stan-
dard deviations were derived using the software tool
suggested by Hess (2010).
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for the posterior wtp distributions for undergrounding segmented by dno as resulting from M5 can be
found in table H.4 in the Appendix. The formular for the calculation of the total valuations is given
in equation 16. To refine the estimates of the dno specific aggregate valuations of undergrounding for
example, we first add up the individual posterior mean valuations of those customers with a positive
wtp for increased undergrounding activity within the respective dno in the sample and then scale these
valuations proportionally to the level of the dno. Table H.4 lists the posterior individual mean valuations
by dno exemplarily for M5. The differences in the posterior means and the posterior standard deviations
confirm that the posterior valuations vary across and within dnos. Figure 2 and 3 plot the posterior
distributions of the wtp for increased undergrounding activity and improved storm resilience respectively
by dno as they result from model M5. The company names have been removed for confidentiality. The
graphs illustrate the substantial heterogeneity in valuations within and across the dnos.
Figure 2: Posterior WTP Distributions for Undergrounding by DNO
Figure 2 plots the posterior distributions of the wtp for undergrounding by dno. There
is substantial heterogeneity in valuations within the dnos.
The total valuation within the population can then be calculated by adding up the valuations across
the dnos. 1R+ is an indicator function that indicates whether the individual mean wtp is positive, ndno
and Ndno indicate the number of customers per dno within sample and population respectively.
Total WTPgmnl =
14∑
dno=1
Ndno
ndno
∗
n∑
i=1
1R+ [ WTP i,dno︸ ︷︷ ︸
indiv. post. mean WTP︸ ︷︷ ︸
within sample WTP within DNO
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
WTP within DNO
(16)
A major drawback of conditional distributions lies in the use in out-of-sample forecasting. When
moving from a sample to a population (as we do in this paper), it becomes necessary to associate specific
conditional parameter estimates from the sample with each individual in the population. This mapping
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Figure 3: Posterior WTP Distributions for Improved Storm Resilience by DNO
Figure 3 plots the posterior distributions of the wtp for improved resilience to storms
by dno. There is substantial heterogeneity in valuations within and across the dnos.
of conditional parameters onto a population is a not always trivial, requiring some form of posterior
analysis linking the conditional distribution to respondent specific information (e.g. income) that is also
available at the population level. In our case, such information is available, but in many other cases the
resepective data might be missing.
6 Policy Implications
We calculate the total attribute valuations by dnos and across dnos that are implied by our approach
to demonstrate its practical implications for the price controls. The valuations resulting from the model
currently employed by Ofgem, i.e. from the mnl model, serve as our baseline to show that the assumption
of homogeneous valuations (i.e. a constant wtp) can lead to suboptimal incentives and ultimately to
inefficient service levels. If there is substantial parameter heterogeneity, the estimated valuations can differ
substantially depending on whether the restrictive mnl or the more flexible random parameter models
are employed. In our application for example we find a significant amount of heterogeneity in customers’
valuations, not only across but also within dnos, that renders the restrictive mnl model incorrect: mnl
yields unreasonably high wtp estimates and is likely to result in inefficiently high allowances and thus
too much investment in undergrounding.
We argue that our more complex yet less restrictive and straightforwardly implementable estimation
strategy yields more reasonable wtp estimates, fits the data better and could facilitate regulation that
reflects customer preferences more realistically. While the heterogeneous scale mixed logit model (gmnl
specification) in wtp space refines the mean estimates, posterior analysis can shed light on the individual
wtp distribution within the population and inform the socially optimal payment plan and distribution
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of services. Our approach can facilitates more efficient incentive setting, both with respect to allocative
and distributive efficiency.
dnos provide services with public good characteristics (such as undergrounding) as well as services
with private good characteristics (such as customer care in case of blackouts). The efficiency implications
of our approach also differ depending on the type of service provided as explained in section 2.
In the case of public goods and services the correct estimation of the aggregated wtp is crucial
to achieve allocative efficiency: since ndno ∗ WTP dno =
ndno∑
i=1
WTPi and recalling that the estimated
means are not significantly different from the posterior means (i.e. WTP dno ≈ 1/ndno
ndno∑
i=1
WTP i), more
precise estimation of the mean and hence total vertically aggregated wtp within dnos can be decisive for
whether the respective service improvement is evaluated as economically viable or not. The individual
wtp distributions can then be exploited to inform the optimal payment plan. As all consumers have
to consume the same quantity of the non-excludable service, the individual wtp cannot be exploited to
differentiate service provision.
Investment in undergrounding of transmission and distribution networks for example is considered a
public service that is provided to all customers. Undergrounding lowers the risk of damages in extreme
events such as major storms or floods and reduces maintenance costs. It can thus improve reliability and
safety of supply. Moreover, the visual amenity is improved (McNair et al., 2011). As McNair et al. (2011)
emphasise, the household benefits are key component in the economic evaluation of undergrounding of
overhead lines. The main question to evaluate its economic viability is whether the households’ aggregate
wtp for undergrounding exceeds the difference between the capital cost of undergrounding and the
present value of ongoing cost savings for network operators. To define the dno specific allowances, Ofgem
estimated the national average customer wtp for the undergrounding of 1.5 per cent overhead lines over
the course of five years (£2.29) and multiplied it by the number of customers served by each dno. For dno
10 for example £5 million were allowed by Ofgem following one of the customer wtp surveys. Ofgem’s
valuations correspond to our estimated customer valuations as derived from the vanilla mnl model: for
dno 10 our estimation implies a total wtp of £4.98 million (2, 359, 391 customers x £2.11 = £4, 978, 785)
for an increase in undergrounding activity by 1.5 percent. When aggregating the dno specific estimates
across all dnos (excluding edf London), this implies a total wtp of about £56.6 million to increase
undergrounding of overhead lines by 1.5 percent per annum (see table 16). This is very close to Ofgem’s
total allowance for the undergrounding of existing overhead lines that was set to £60.6 million for the
five years from 2010 to 2015. However, given our analysis this estimated cap is likely to be too high.
As our results in section 6 and 7 showed, the mnl results in confounded mean estimates of the wtp.
The models allowing for random parameters (flexible mixing distributions) yield different mean and hence
aggregated valuations. Table 16 illustrates the practical significance of the refined estimation strategy.
The table lists the total valuations per dno (£per annum) for an increase of undergrounding activity
from by 1.5 to 3 percent per annum. These aggregate values were derived from the estimated valuations
per customer (£per annum) presented in tables 6 and 7. The customer level valuations were multiplied
with the customer numbers per dno as listed in table H.2 in the Appendix and resulted in the valuations
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Table 16: Total WTP (£per annum per dno) for underground-
ing 1.5% more of existing overhead lines (proportionally scaled
with number of customers in dno as listed in table H.2)
M1/M2 M4 M5
1.5% more undergd MNL MXL GMNL
1 5,516,409 5,275,323 2,311,313
2 5,163,554 4,709,555 1,795,831
3 7,421,273 7,005,532 3,023,690
5 4,712,683 4,383,379 1,794,435
6 1,563,168 1,405,633 530,340
7 6,192,551 5,780,252 2,394,334
8 4,765,683 4,306,830 1,563,004
9 3,325,011 3,184,523 1,401,679
10 4,978,785 4,803,725 2,062,617
11 2,319,812 2,042,051 722,015
12 3,252,214 3,120,650 1,461,475
13 3,133,969 2,836,783 1,131,818
14 4,205,623 3,896,866 1,572,062
Total 56,550,735 52,751,100 21,764,613
% of mnl base 100% 93% 38%
% of mxl base 100% 41%
Table 16 illustrates that the consideration of parameter heterogeneity can
have a remarkable impact on the estimated aggregate valuations. In the
case of undergrounding the allowances implied by the baseline model (in
total £55.5m) would be too high. When considering preference an scale
heterogeneity in the population and aggregating the individual mean wtp
as suggested by equation 16, the value of undergrounding to the customers
is much lower (£21.7m).
listed in table 1.6.
The valuations derived from the mnl model result in remarkable overestimation of the value of un-
dergrounding. Moving from mnl to mxl, i.e. from homogeneous to heterogeneous preferences, reduces
the estimated total valuations by up to 10 percent. When a heterogeneous scale parameter is introduced,
the valuations are reduced further and can be less than half of the valuations derived from mnl. These
differences in means highlight that the current manner to inform incentive rates is likely to result in too
high allowances and hence overinvestment in undergrounding.15
A further example for a resilience service with public good characteristics is the investment in grid
resilience to storms. The differences in aggregate valuations across models are comparable to the case of
undergrounding as can be seen in table 17. The number of customers currently affected by storms differs
remarkably by dno. The discrete choice experiment therefore defined the changes in storm resilience
relative to the dno specific status quo. For comparison of the total valuations, we transform the estimates
in valuations per 1,000 customers.
15The differences might be smaller in cases where customers choose less randomly. In cases where heterogeneity in the
randomness of choice is likely, though, accounting for scale heterogeneity proves essential for more realistic estimates.
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Table 17: Total valuations for improved resilience to storms (£per
1,000 customers per annum) by DNO
WTP less storm damage
£per 1,000 customers M1/M2 M4 M5
per dno MNL MXL GMNL
1 289,441 259,325 119,729
2 270,927 236,620 106,442
3 269,576 251,807 117,111
5 1,112,717 969,694 447,774
6 184,541 162,450 72,373
7 417,751 376,800 178,423
8 750,154 653,582 292,012
9 314,029 275,272 129,364
10 783,698 721,738 370,188
11 365,156 312,980 129,831
12 219,395 200,509 98,020
13 493,310 435,892 189,654
14 661,996 588,732 270,251
Total 6,132,691 5,445,402 2,521,172
% of mnl base 100% 89% 41%
% of mxl base 100% 46%
Table 17 illustrates that the consideration of parameter heterogeneity can have
a remarkable impact on the estimated aggregate valuations. In the case of storm
resilience the valuation implied by the baseline model is £0.6m per annum per
1,000 customers less affected by storms. When considering preference an scale
heterogeneity in the population and aggregating the individual mean wtp as
suggested by equation 16, the value of storm resilience as measured per 1,000
customers affected by storms is much lower (£0.2m per 1,000 customers per
annum).
gmnl could thus improve the estimate of the optimal level of resilience services and posterior analysis
could help to determine the optimal payment plan. With smart grid technologies, however, storm re-
silience is likely to become more rivalrous and excludable, as remote control and battery technologies on
a local grid level will play an increasingly important role. Moreover, small-scale energy production units
might be located closer to users, i.e. residential areas, leading to changes in the everyday landscape.
Being natural monopolies, the dnos have little incentive to pay attention to consumer preferences or
to engage the public, unless incentivised to do so. riio-ed1 does provide such incentives as it explic-
itly rewards consideration of customer preferences. Political sensitivities regarding differentiated service
quality provision are likely, but compared to the central government, local governments may be more
inclined to assign differentiated quality services. This implies that with the development of smart-grids,
differentiated service quality levels across the country and within dnos could result. As an example, local
network operators could differentiate their electricity service quality in terms of reliability or customer
service during black-outs. Consumers who are willing to accept a lower degree of reliability or who are
willing to give local grid operators access to their electric appliances to provide demand response, for
example, could be charged lower prices than consumers who are willing to pay for a high degree of supply
reliablity, a reliable customer service and/or do not want to provide demand response.
We recommend that, where economically and technically feasible, companies should be rewarded for
providing more targeted, customer specific services. One scenario that could be considered for example
is to allow for and reward differentiated, customer specific distribution charges. Price discrimination
41
7 CONCLUSION
Figure 4: The Evolution Patterns of Regulation
Source: Viljainen (2005), p.33
could ensure revenues that cover the companies’ fixed costs (i.e. result in sufficient return on investment)
and lead to a more efficient distribution of services in the population. Vulnerable consumers could be
protected by a separate separate price cap. Figure 4 illustrates the potential transition to company
specific incentives in which customer specific contracting may be taken into account and rewarded.
For such incentive regulation posterior analysis as suggested in this paper could prove particularly
useful, as it gives insight into the distribution of preferences within the population (rather than just the
mean or the aggregate). The more excludable and differentiated the resilience services become, the more
the individual wtp distributions has potential merits for both, allocative as well as distributive efficiency.
7 Conclusion
We present an alternative approach to explore customer preferences and wtp for resilience of the elec-
tricity grid and demonstrate its practical relevance using the example of the uk’s incentive regulation
scheme for distribution network companies. Our analysis is based on data from the stated preference
survey ‘Expectations of dnos & Willingness to Pay for Improvements in Service’ that was conducted
for Ofgem to inform the price control period from 2010 to 2015. Valuations of the undergrounding of
overhead lines and the grid resilience to storms are in focus. In contrast to the existing manner to in-
form incentive rates, we flexibly account for heterogeneity in customers’ valuations and choice behaviour,
across and within the dnos. More precisely, we estimate the heterogeneous scale mixed logit (gmnl)
model in wtp space and perform posterior analysis to further improve the estimates. A main advantage
of estimation in wtp space is that the distributional assumptions are directly imposed on the wtp.
We segment the data only post estimation to derive the summary statistics and the total valuations
per dno. The aim is to derive the incentives as they would result for each dno based on the posterior
estimates. Our results are consistent with previous literature that suggests that models which accom-
modate scale heterogeneity or are estimated in wtp space yield more realistic wtp distributions in the
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sense that they are more bounded and suffer less from outliers.
Our estimates of interest are all significant and have the expected signs: while customers ask for
compensation for deterioration of resilience, they are willing to pay for services that improve resilience
such as the undergrounding of overhead lines or the reduction of the number of customers that is affected
by blackouts due to storms. We also find significant differences between wtp and wta for a given
service attribute. Our results suggest significant parameter heterogeneity and model fit is best for models
that allow for heterogeneous preferences and scale. Our approach delivers more reasonable estimates of
customers’ valuation of grid resilience, not only on the individual, but also on the aggregated level of the
dnos and the population. We show that the assumptions on heterogeneity in the population can have
significant implications for the price controls. If the valuation of resilience services is based on the current
methodology, an inefficient supply of service quality is likely. We specifically highlight that the current
manner to inform incentive rates, which assumes homogeneous valuations in the population, is likely to
result in too high allowances and hence overinvestment in undergrounding.
We agree with Ofgem that incentives should be tailored for the dnos individually, but recommend to
also take heterogeneity within the customer base of any dno into account. We suggest that, where eco-
nomically and technically feasible, companies should be rewarded for providing more targeted, customer
specific services. For such incentive regulation posterior analysis as suggested in this paper could prove
particularly useful, as it gives insight into the distribution of preferences within the population (rather
than just the mean or the aggregate). The more excludable and differentiated the resilience services
become, the more the exploitation of the individual wtp distributions can matter for both, allocative as
well as distributive efficiency. Our approach can deliver more realistic estimates, is straightforward to
implement and could foster more targeted incentive setting.
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8 Appendix
RPI-X and RIIO
From 1990 to 2015 the incentive regulation model of distribution networks in Britain has been a hybrid of
different schemes that incentivised operating expenditure (Opex), capital spending (Capex) and quality
of service separately: under the so-called rpi-x regulation the utilities’ controllable Opex was incentivised
by benchmarking against an efficient frontier made up of the best practice dnos in the sector. The allowed
Opex was set such that it required dnos to close a specific proportion of their performance gap relative
to the frontier during the price control period. To assess the required level of Capex over a price control
period, the utilities had to submit a business plan with the projected capital expenditure. Usually a lower
level of capital expenditures was recommended by the regulator and to this level an incentive scheme
that resembled a menu of contracts regulation model was applied. Quality of service was incentivised
separately through performance targets. The targets for each dno were individual and deviation from
these resulted in company specific penalties and rewards that affected the total allowed revenue. This
hybrid of incentive regulation implied a trade-off between Opex and Capex savings and the provision of
non-tradable outputs such as service quality. Several studies proved an under-supply of service quality.
Given the trade-offs under rpi-x, an integrated benchmarking approach was suggested and imple-
mented with riio16. riio is the new performance based model for setting the network companies‘ price
controls in the uk and has been effective since January 2015. It builds on the previous rpi-x regime, but
better meets the investment and innovation challenge. It is designed to promote smarter networks for
a low carbon future that accommodate renewables, distributed generation, microgeneration and active
demand (Ofgem, 2014). There are three separate price controls under riio: riio-t1 regulates the high
voltage electricity and gas transmission for 2013-2021. riio-gd1 regulates gas distribution and riio-ed1
relates to the distribution, i.e. transport of electricity at lower voltage level to homes and commercial
customers. riio-ed1 aims to provide strong incentives to ensure reliable supply. Moreover, Ofgem intro-
duced a package of connection incentives to encourage the dnos to provide a better service for connecting
customers, in particular those connecting low carbon technologies and distributed generation. Under riio
the dnos are also incentivised to engage with local authorities, health providers, suppliers, other utilities
and community groups in order to use the information they collectively hold on customers in vulnerable
situations. riio is based on Totex, which means that the regulator adds all cost measures as well as some
measure of monetary values of service quality (such as wtp) and network losses together to determine
the allowed revenue. This mitigates the previously often critisised Opex/Capex bias.
However, even if riio is an improvement over previous schemes, not much has changed in terms
of the methodology to estimate customer preferences and wtp for the diverse outputs. The incentive
rates are based on estimates resulting from simple mnl models that assume homogeneous preferences or
16riio stands for Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs.
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presume specific segments of consumer preferences. We show that the simplified assumptions employed
by regulators such as Ofgem can have significant implications for the price controls.
Beauly - Denny Example
The Beauly-Denny High Voltage Transmission Line illustrates the evaluation challenges of investments
in grid infrastructure. It is a high profile grid development project but not part of the price control, as it
is not considered a national necessity for competition and consumer protection. However, in 2004 Ofgem
created the Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation mechanism (tirg) to fund transmission
projects specific to the connection of renewables (Tobiasson, 2015) and granted the transmission compa-
nies the right to recover the project cost from their customers. The project involves the construction of
a 220 kilometres long 400kV double circuit overhead transmission line set to replace the current single
circuit 132kV transmission line (Tobiasson et al, 2015). The new line will mainly follow the same route as
the old line, however changes in the use of land in the course of time required slight deviations from the
old route. The landscape along the line is characterised by varying land uses including remote moorland,
forests, river valleys, roads (A9), areas of famous tourist attractions (e.g. Stirling Castle and the Wallace
monument) and some more populated areas. The project generated close to 20,000 objections from all
over the world and led to the longest ever public inquiry in Scotland (Tobiasson et al, 2015). One of the
reasons for this strong opposition was the demand for some sort of compensation. As Tobiasson et al.
(2015) emphasise: ’the potential for financial compensation in transmission projects provides the basis
for further research in the future. In principle, the redistribution of costs and benefits to reach a socially
optimal outcome is a viable and seeming solution, yet its application in practice provides numerous ob-
stacles. Further research is needed to establish the scope and perhaps the most efficient form of financial
compensation, including the separation of assets.’ North (1994) points out that the formal rules within
the incentive regulation scheme have not been created to be socially efficient, but are rather designed to
benefit those with bargaining power, i.e. the network companies with their capital and resource equip-
ment and their experience. Even if Ofgem claims to focus on consumer interests, consumer participation
is still low (Littlechild, ????). The investigation of customer preferences and their consideration in the
decision process can be crucial for timely and effective decision making. When engaging customers it is
important to keep in mind that communities are heterogeneous. They consist of many individuals and
local firms with different preferences that might change over time (Tobiasson et al., 2015). Devine-Wright
et al. (2010) for example find that communities that were more familiar with electricity transmission and
generation facilities, such as renewable energy host communities, were generally more understanding and
sympathetic to the idea of the new power-line.
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Table H.1: Summary Statistics - Proportions
Social Class
A 1%
B 16%
C1 29%
C2 23%
DE 30%
Age
16-29 20%
30-49 41%
50+ 38%
Children
0 77%
1 15%
2 7%
3 1%
4 0%
5 0%
Annual income
Under 10000 15%
10000-20000 23%
20001-30000 15%
30001-40000 11%
40001-50000 6%
50000-60000 2%
Over 60000 2%
Dont know 6%
Refused 20%
Table H.2: Number of Customers per dno
dnoID Customers
1 2,614,165
2 2.446,951
3 3,516,859
5 2,233,288
6 740,768
7 2,934,581
8 2,258,404
9 1,575,686
10 2,359,391
11 1,099,333
12 1,541,188
13 1,485,153
14 1,992,998
26,798,765
Mean 2,061,443
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Figure 6: Summary Statistics by dno
Figure 6 illustrates that there is heterogeneity in observables characteristics across
dnos. E.g.: while around 80 percent of the customers of cn West customers
experienced power cuts, only 30 percent of the customers of sse Hydro experienced
power cuts within the last 12 months.
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Table H.3: MNL with selected interac-
tions
MNL
Cost (£) -0.109∗∗∗
(0.0115)
ASC2 -0.621∗∗∗
(0.0594)
ASC3 -0.763∗∗∗
(0.0593)
Less undergd (-1.5%) 0.254
(0.376)
More undergd (+1.5%) 0.661∗∗∗
(0.199)
More storm damage (+10%) -0.273∗∗∗
(0.0254)
Less storm damage (-10%) 0.170∗∗∗
(0.0240)
Less flood risk 0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0141)
Less CO2 0.382∗∗∗
(0.0446)
costXinc2 0.0303∗∗
(0.0114)
costXinc3 0.0381∗∗
(0.0132)
costXinc4 0.0462∗∗∗
(0.0130)
costXinc5 0.0613∗∗∗
(0.0132)
costXinc6 0.0700∗∗∗
(0.0167)
costXinc7 0.0750∗∗∗
(0.0146)
costXinc8 0.0201
(0.0147)
costXinc9 0.0186
(0.0142)
lCO2Xinc7 0.559∗∗∗
(0.141)
luXage3 -0.115
(0.0634)
lCO2Xage2 -0.0173
(0.0538)
lCO2Xage3 -0.143∗∗
(0.0539)
costXjob4 -0.0284∗∗∗
(0.00739)
costXjob5 -0.0200∗
(0.00976)
luXjob2 -0.435
(0.381)
luXjob3 -0.515
(0.377)
luXjob4 -0.490
(0.378)
luXjob5 -0.366
(0.376)
muXjob2 -0.454∗
(0.208)
muXjob3 -0.446∗
(0.203)
muXjob4 -0.495∗
(0.205)
muXjob5 -0.538∗∗
(0.204)
luXexpcuts -0.258∗∗∗
(0.0639)
N 36036
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table lists the results from a MNL model
with the selected interactions.
51
8 APPENDIX
Table H.4: Posterior Summary Statistics by DNO: WTP Dis-
tributions as Resulting from M5
1.5% More Undergrounding 10% Less Storm Damage
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
1 0.87 0.48 -0.88 2.19 0.83 0.49 -0.51 2.37
2 0.72 0.51 -0.39 3.01 0.78 0.40 -0.23 1.68
3 0.85 0.51 -0.60 2.51 0.87 0.48 -0.29 2.25
5 0.79 0.55 -0.70 2.71 0.80 0.46 -0.47 2.09
6 0.70 0.46 -0.69 2.25 0.78 0.41 -0.35 2.13
7 0.81 0.46 -0.25 2.25 0.85 0.49 -0.28 2.54
8 0.68 0.45 -0.63 1.94 0.78 0.48 -0.55 1.92
9 0.89 0.51 -0.17 2.33 0.82 0.46 -0.30 2.19
10 0.87 0.49 -0.71 2.73 0.94 0.48 -0.12 2.55
11 0.64 0.45 -1.00 1.55 0.71 0.42 -0.48 2.14
12 0.94 0.54 -0.92 2.70 0.89 0.49 -0.76 2.71
13 0.75 0.45 -0.47 2.34 0.77 0.43 -0.31 2.10
14 0.77 0.55 -1.15 2.40 0.81 0.41 -0.25 2.20
Table H.4 lists the summary statistic of the estimated individual posterior
means by dno. The individual means vary within and across dnos.
Table H.5: Mean Customer Valuations of Improved Storm
Resilience by DNO (£per annum per 1,000 customers affected).
DNO Customers currently WTP per 1,000 customers
affected by storms less affected by storms
# % of dno M1/M2 M3 M4 M5
1 180,000 7% 0.111 0.046 0.099 0.046
2 180,000 7% 0.111 0.046 0.097 0.044
3 260,000 7% 0.077 0.032 0.072 0.033
45 40,000 2% 0.498 0.206 0.434 0.201
6 80,000 11% 0.249 0.103 0.219 0.098
7 140,000 5% 0.142 0.059 0.128 0.061
8 60,000 3% 0.332 0.137 0.289 0.129
9 100,000 6% 0.199 0.082 0.175 0.082
10 60,000 3% 0.332 0.137 0.306 0.157
11 60,000 5% 0.332 0.137 0.285 0.118
12 140,000 9% 0.142 0.059 0.130 0.064
13 60,000 4% 0.332 0.137 0.294 0.128
14 60,000 3% 0.332 0.137 0.295 0.136
Table H.5 lists the wtp for 10 percent less customers affected by storms
transformed into wtp per 1,000 customers. Based on table H.2, which
lists the total number of customers per dno, we calculated the share of
customers that is currently affected by storms.
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Table H.6: Aggregate WTP (£per annum per DNO) for Flood Resilience and CO2 Reductions
Less flood risk M1/M2 M3 M4 M5
1 1,958,325 792,092 1,397,768 957,569
2 1,833,062 741,426 1,190,597 770,044
3 2,634,552 1,065,608 1,719,915 1,170,792
5 1,673,002 676,686 1,113,030 706,826
6 554,925 224,453 338,790 218,960
7 2,198,356 889,178 1,525,340 999,027
8L 1,691,817 684,296 1,062,593 615,674
9 1,180,379 477,433 767,176 524,252
10 1,767,469 714,895 1,242,095 784,420
11 823,533 333,098 467,021 254,174
12 1,154,536 466,980 805,908 529,988
13 1,112,559 450,001 727,922 491,089
14 1,492,996 603,878 967,346 560,622
Total 20,075,511 8,120,026 13,325,502 8,583,439
less CO2 M1/M2 M3 M4 M5
1 10,021,477 3,973,531 8,461,375 3,914,818
2 9,380,457 3,719,366 7,872,528 3,700,671
3 13,481,980 5,345,626 11,029,440 5,116,312
5 8,561,374 3,394,598 7,143,592 3,193,675
6 2,839,755 1,125,967 2,221,042 890,643
7 11,249,801 4,460,563 9,781,395 4,659,046
8 8,657,657 3,432,774 6,567,016 2,513,534
9 6,040,438 2,395,043 4,932,101 2,202,341
10 9,044,793 3,586,274 7,743,877 3,491,881
11 4,214,325 1,670,986 3,123,962 1,094,454
12 5,908,188 2,342,606 5,129,252 2,402,634
13 5,693,377 2,257,433 4,777,509 2,203,551
14 7,640,215 3,029,357 6,434,237 2,945,616
Total 102,733,835 40,734,123 85,217,325 38,329,177
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